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ABSTRACT
This study investigates modern French criticism of jury trial mediation in the United
States. By engaging the work of twentieth-century French theorists Jean Baudrillard, Guy
Debord, and Pierre Bourdieu, as well as French journalistic reporting on the jury trials of O.J.
Simpson, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, and Casey Anthony, this study argues that mediated images
of the American jury trial abandon the pursuit of justice in favor of a consumer capitalist
endeavor to create spectacle. Ultimately, jury trial mediation generates a hyperreality in which
the media simulates the pursuit of justice with no reference to the “real” pursuit of justice.
In order to examine the progression of jury trial mediation toward the hyperreal, this
study situates images of the jury trial within Jean Baudrillard’s four image phases, which mark
the transition from the representation of the “real”—defined in this study as the pursuit of
justice— to its simulation. Chapter one presents phase one and phase two images through the
lens of French intellectual Régine Hollander’s theatrical analysis of courtroom proceedings.
Chapter two examines phase three images from the Neo-Marxist and sociological perspectives of
Guy Debord and Pierre Bourdieu. Finally, phase four images—simulacra with no reference to
the “real”—are explored in chapter three. French reporting on the jury trials of Simpson,
Anthony, and Strauss-Kahn will appear as case studies at the conclusion of each chapter.
This study suggests that, for French intellectuals and journalists, jury trial mediation in
the U.S. loses reference with and ultimately jeopardizes the “real” pursuit of justice. French
criticism, along with fundamental differences in French and American legal and media systems,
further reveal that the hyperreality of jury trial mediation—born of a cultural, consumer capitalist
penchant for spectacle—constitutes a uniquely American phenomenon that would never come to
pass in France.

iii

	
  

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………...1
Theoretical Framework………………………………………………………………………….3
Case Studies: O.J. Simpson, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, and Casey Anthony…………………..7
CHAPTER 1: From the Courtroom Theatre to Onscreen Spectacle………………………….....10
1.1

Inside the Courtroom Theatre……………………………………………………………11

1.2

The Courtroom Theatre Onscreen: Transition into Spectacle…………………………...16

1.3

O.J. Simpson and the “Dream Team”……………………………………………………20

CHAPTER 2: Mediated Spectacle, Consumer Capitalism, and the Absence of the “Real”…….25
2.1 Mediated Spectacle-as-Capital……………………………………………………………..26
2.2 Mediated Spectacle and the Absence of the “Real”………………………………………..30
2.3 Dominique Strauss-Kahn and the “Perp Walk”……………………………………………33
2.4 The O.J. Simpson Trial and Capital Gain………………………………………………….38
CHAPTER 3: Mediated Speculation and Hyperreality………………………………………….44
3.1 Mediated Simulation and the “Implosion of Meaning”……………………………………45
3.2 Hyperreal Speculation as Exemplified by Nancy Grace…………………………………...47
3.3 The Hyperreal Court of Public Opinion Inside the “Real” Courtroom……………………50
3.4 French Reporting on the Hyperspeculated and Hypermediated Anthony Trial…………...52
CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………………………..57
Implications and Limitations…………………………………………………………………..58
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………………………..62
VITA……………………………………………………………………………………………..68

iv

	
  
INTRODUCTION
America makes its fascination with crime and punishment quite evident: a quick scroll
through television channels reveals numerous fictional crime dramas and networks dedicated to
real-life court cases. Moreover, the intrigue of judicial proceedings seeps into the rosters of
news networks, which tend to favor jury trials that exhibit remarkable crimes—or defendants—
over more mundane, everyday cases. Such interest on the part of producers and the American
spectators to whom they appeal is unsurprising and might, at first glance, appear indicative of an
innocent—perhaps even noble—attempt to foster an informed public and uphold justice.
However, the media’s penchant for extraordinary jury trials is, instead, rooted in an endeavor to
generate entertainment—an easy goal to achieve, given the theatrical nature of the lawyer’s
colorful exposition before the juror. The transmission of mediated jury trial images that aim to
amuse viewers marks the media’s transition away from the pursuit of justice and into the realm
of spectacle, which dictates the diffusion of only the most sensational images of the most
remarkable cases. Furthermore, spectacle is inextricably linked to consumer capitalism, which
chiefly reveals itself via the American public’s insatiable demand for sensational images and the
media’s subsequent capital gain via network ratings and the creation of “star” journalists.
Beyond the capitalist use of spectacular jury trial images—problematic in its own right—media
“stars” transcend the domain of spectacle by broadcasting speculative images. The projection of
speculation disguised as news—often in the form of public polls, live phone calls with viewers,
input from “expert” panelists, and the opinions of media “stars,” themselves—appears to signal
total indifference to the pursuit of justice. However, its implications transcend indifference:
speculative jury trial images simulate the pursuit of justice, generating a hyperreal with no
reference to “real” justice.
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The intersection of jury trial images with spectacle and consumer capitalism, and
ultimately their generation of a hyperreality, attracts criticism from French intellectuals and
journalists who question the effect of mediated images on the American pursuit of justice.
French criticism largely relates to the American media system, which differs notably from the
French equivalent. For instance, according to a study published in the Journal of
Communication at New York University, the American “liberal” model of mediation unites
commercialism with information, whereas the French “polarized pluralist” model places greater
emphasis on deliberation (Benson 22). With regard to jury trial mediation, the French system is
notably more conservative: while the question of news cameras inside the courtroom—for the
purpose of live trial coverage—varies state to state in the U.S., French law prohibits the release
of images depicting courtroom proceedings until a sufficient amount of time has passed to allow
the trial—and any process of appeal—to conclude (Barbier 7). Furthermore, the French “Loi
Guigou,” enacted on June 15, 2000 under the co-sponsorship of Elisabeth Guigou, the Minister
of Justice at the time, prohibits the diffusion of images that incriminate—or threaten the dignity
of—trial defendants; images of an alleged perpetrator in handcuffs, for instance, while common
place in American mediated images, is illegal in France (Barbier 7). Although this study will
emphasize French criticism of the American media, it is noteworthy that the American legal
system also endures some reproach from the French, due in large part to the pivotal influence of
the lawyer in American common-law courtroom proceedings, which contrasts to the less lawyerdominated, nonadversary model featured in the French civil-law system (Tomlinson 134).
Given the distinguishing characteristics of the American and French media and legal
systems, this study will engage the theoretical perspectives of various French intellectuals,
chiefly twentieth-century theorists Jean Baudrillard, Guy Debord, and Pierre Bourdieu, in
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addition to French journalistic reporting on the jury trials of O.J. Simpson, Dominique StraussKahn, and Casey Anthony, in order to prove the following argument: French intellectuals and
journalists are critical of the media’s coverage of jury trials in the United States insofar as it
diffuses images that gradually depart from the pursuit of justice in order to cater to a consumer
capitalist appetite for spectacle, which in turn facilitates the generation of a hyperreality where
mediated images constitute simulacra with no reference to the “real” pursuit of justice. This
study will define the American “media” as national, televised news networks—like CNN and
ABC—and the “public” as the media’s American viewers.

Theoretical Framework
The notions of simulacra and hyperreality—developed by sociologist and philosopher
Jean Baudrillard—will constitute much of the theoretical framework for this study. In Simulacra
and Simulation, Baudrillard distinguishes between an image as a representation of reality and
simulacra—an image or copy without an original to represent. He offers as an example the idea
of God, the many images of which, rather than represent the notion of God, create it insofar as
the images generate and “deploy” their own “power and pomp of fascination” (4). In other
words, the images of God simulate the idea of God—the original or the “real”—and therefore
constitute simulacra—“a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real” itself (2).
Having lost reference to the “real,” simulacra constitute a new, regenerative reality that is
hyperreality, in which the distinction between “true” and “false” or “real” and “imaginary”
dissipates, and meaning collapses on itself. Baudrillard outlines four sequential phases through
which an image transitions from representation to simulacrum: in phase one, the image is a
reflection or representation of the “real”—it is “a good appearance;” in phase two, the image

3

	
  
distorts the “real”—it is “an evil appearance;” in phase three, the image masks the absence of the
“real”—“it plays at being an appearance;” and in phase four, the image is “pure simulacrum”
with no reference to the “real”—“it is no longer of the order of appearances” (6; original
emphasis). For Baudrillard, these phases illustrate an irreversible societal progression; American
culture—which he classifies as postmodern—has already achieved phase four. In other words,
postmodern America is fully, irrevocably hyperreal. This study will contradict Baudrillard in
this regard by situating mediated jury trial images within his four image phases—as if they exist
simultaneously—in order to highlight the images’ transition from representation to the hyperreal.
In order to apply Baudrillard’s image phases to the mediated jury trial, this study will
define the “real” as the pursuit of justice (i.e. the genuine interest in whether the defendant is
guilty or innocent). In the jury trial context, phases one and two—the representation and
distortion of the “real”— correspond with “images” presented by the lawyer inside the
courtroom, whose chief objective is to act in the interest of his/her client. Jury trial images
transition into phase three—the masking of the absence of the “real”—at their intersection with
the media, whose emphasis on the spectacular elements of scandalous trials replaces the pursuit
of justice with the pursuit of spectacle and capital gain. Phase four—pure simulacra and the
entrance into hyperreality—is marked by the media’s projection of speculation via opinion polls,
“expert” panelists, and so forth. Speculative jury trial images simulate, rather than reflect, the
“real” pursuit of justice; together with consumers of such images, the media generates a
hyperreal court of public opinion, which ultimately affects change in the actual courtroom.
This study will begin by examining jury trial images at the fundamental level of the
courtroom where, for French intellectual Régine Hollander, proceedings resemble theatre, which
is noteworthy insofar as courtroom theatricality plays into spectacle. According to Hollander,
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the lawyer in the courtroom functions as an actor, producer, and dramatist who ultimately
presents a play to appeal to the juror-as-spectator. Hollander cites numerous interviews with
American law professors concerning the use of simulation—mock trials—and acting classes in
law school curricula, as well as the prevalence of cinematic, dramatized depictions of the jury
trial as a pedagogical tool. In the context of Baudrillard’s image phases, the “images” the
lawyer-as-actor presents before the juror function as phase one images. While the lawyer-asactor frames them in a way that, according to Hollander’s research, is designed to appeal to the
juror’s emotions, they still qualify as representations of the “real” pursuit of justice. On another
level, the lawyer-as-producer-and-dramatist presents phase two images that distort the “real”
pursuit of justice insofar as he/she controls what and how information is presented before the
juror in order to serve the interest of his/her client. The lawyer’s theatrics furthermore inspires
various small-screen and cinematic productions. While not problematic in themselves, these
fictional depictions of courtroom procedures are often used as pedagogical tools in law school
curricula, where they teach law students how to present a compelling image. This suggests a sort
of virtual redoubling in which the lawyer inspires fiction, which then doubles back to inspire the
lawyer’s behavior in the courtroom, and so forth. Ultimately, the courtroom theatre—especially
the phase two images presented by the lawyer-as-producer-and-dramatist—calls into question
whether courtroom proceedings hinge on the pursuit of justice or the ability of the lawyer to act,
that is, to inspire spectacle.
Jury trial images enter Baudrillard’s third phase the moment they are diffused by the
media, which replaces—and hides the absence of—the pursuit of justice with the pursuit of
spectacle. Entrance into phase three is facilitated by the permission of news cameras inside the
courtroom and the engagement of highly mediated, spectacular events like the “perp walk.” In
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this phase, the media selects only the most spectacular trials—which typically entail a celebrity
defendant or an especially appalling crime—of which it both emphasizes the most sensational
elements and spectacularizes the mundane. From the neo-Marxist perspective of theorist Guy
Debord, the pursuit of spectacle is linked to consumer capitalism. Debord argues that spectacle
constitutes the “absolute fulfillment” of consumer capitalism; having replaced commodity use
value with sign value, it assumes the form of an image (6). Furthermore, spectacle regenerates
itself by feeding the consumerist appetite for spectacular images, ultimately conditioning
consumers to seek spectacle everywhere. In other words, consumers participate in the media’s
pursuit of spectacle by maintaining a demand for spectacular images. Sociologist and
philosopher Pierre Bourdieu examines mediated spectacle from a sociological perspective,
emphasizing the media’s penchant for “sensational news” that “calls for dramatization […], that
puts an event on stage, puts it into images,” which ultimately serves the capitalist agenda of
media “stars” and corporations via network ratings (19). The function of mediated spectacle in
phase three—the extent to which it replaces the pursuit of justice—is exemplified by the “perp
walk,” “perp” being short for “perpetrator.” The “perp walk” refers to the accusation and
subsequent arrest of a supposed perpetrator, who is handcuffed by police and paraded before the
cameras of various media outlets. This practice criminalizes the defendant by celebrating his/her
arrest before allowing for due process of law, which undermines the American—and French, for
that matter—premise that one is innocent until proven guilty. Ultimately, mediated images of
the “perp walk” illustrate the media’s pursuit of spectacle in lieu of justice in Baudrillard’s third
image phase.
Finally, mediated jury trial images enter phase four—where they constitute pure
simulacra with no reference to the pursuit of justice—when they take the form of speculation.
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Whereas the first three images phases were of the “order of appearances” (Baudrillard 6), images
in phase four have no relation to the “real;” rather, they simulate it, generating a self-referential
hyperreality. The media simulates the pursuit of justice by projecting the opinions of “star”
journalists, “expert” panelists, and viewers. Furthermore, the American public in phase four
becomes part of the media’s simulation, generating what can be termed a hyperreal court of
public opinion. By simulating the pursuit of justice, mediated jury trial simulacra cause the
“implosion of meaning” whereby they abolish the distinction between the “simulated” and the
“real.” Without the “real,” these speculative images refer exclusively to themselves, infinitely
regenerating the hyperreal. Finally, the hyperreal court of public opinion doubles back to affect
change inside the actual courtroom, where it undermines the “real” pursuit of justice altogether.

Case Studies: O.J. Simpson, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, and Casey Anthony
A professional football player with a successful acting career, Orenthal James “O.J.”
Simpson, or “The Juice,” as his fans remember him, was charged with the double homicide of
his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her friend, Ronald Goldman on June 17, 1994. Often
deemed “the trial of the century,” the Simpson affair spanned 474 days from his arrest to his
acquittal, and cost an estimated nine million dollars. Simpson’s indictment and trial only
increased his celebrity, thanks in part to a low-speed car chase the day of his arrest (which
captivated around 95 million television viewers), Simpson’s release of a memoir while
imprisoned, and a general media frenzy that included numerous talk shows with family and
friends of the victims and courtroom players—even Judge Ito’s wife. French journalists largely
criticize the Simpson affair—or “circus,” as Jean-Paul Dubois calls it—with regard to its overthe-top mediation, which transformed a murder trial into a spectacle. Furthermore, consumer
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capitalism became a major theme in most French reporting on the trial, which emphasized
Simpson’s preexisting wealth and the capital gain enjoyed by news network, courtroom players,
and even members of the public (Dubois 106). For French journalists, the Simpson “circus”
ultimately cast an incriminating light on the impact of spectacle, capitalism, and theatrical
lawyers on the American pursuit of justice.
The role of spectacle in American jury trial mediation hit closer to home for the French
with the indictment of Dominique Strauss-Kahn on May 14, 2011. Managing Director of the
International Monetary Fund and a leading candidate for the 2012 French presidency, DSK was
arrested and charged with the sexual assault and attempted rape of Sofitel New York Hotel maid,
Nafissatou Kiallo. Taken into custody aboard an Air France jet, a handcuffed DSK was escorted
out of the Kennedy International Airport before rows of news cameras in a “perp walk” that
would outrage French journalists. Beyond his innocence or guilt, the DSK “perp walk” earned
an overwhelming amount of negative coverage by the French media, which accused the practice
of at once attacking the defendant’s dignity and undermining the presumption of innocence.
Charges against DSK were dismissed on August 23, 2011, but French criticism of the “perp
walk’s” incriminating nature—one journalist refered to it as “exécution médiatique”—would
resonate long after the trial’s conclusion. For many French journalists, the DSK affair seemed
indicative of a media system and culture that value spectacle over the pursuit of justice.
While the French were seething over the DSK “perp walk,” much of the American public
had its sights on the acquittal of Casey Anthony, a Florida woman accused of murdering her twoyear-old daughter, Caylee. Though Anthony’s trial would not begin until May 24, 2011, the
media began its coverage of the affair beginning with her arrest in 2008. While the Anthony trial
made the headlines of a number of national news networks, HLN’s exhaustive coverage of the
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affair was the most striking—notably due to “star” news anchor Nancy Grace’s “Justice for
Caylee” crusade.1 Known for her angry tirades and shameless assumption of guilt, Grace
effectively ‘tries’ defendants in her own ‘court’ by conducting dramatic phone interviews with
family members and friends of courtroom players, hosting numerous “expert” panelists (often
former lawyers or HLN producers), and closely analyzing images of defendants in court. When
Anthony was acquitted on July 5, 2011 after 33 days in court, Grace proclaimed before her
estimated 4.57 million viewers that “the devil [was] dancing [that] night,” and assured that she
would continue her “Justice for Caylee” campaign until Anthony was behind bars. French
reporting on the Anthony affair took note of Grace’s over-the-top trial coverage, which it largely
criticized for projecting speculation that undermined the presumption of innocence.
This study will reference the jury trials of Simpson, DSK, and Anthony throughout each
chapter in order to illustrate the work of French theorists and intellectuals. French reporting on
these trials—treated as case studies—will appear at the end of each chapter.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1
HLN is a CNN Worldwide network, which is a division of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.—
a Time Warner Company.
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CHAPTER 1: From the Courtroom Theatre to Onscreen Spectacle
The American jury trial begins its journey toward hyperreality well before the flash of the
journalist’s camera; it originates at the fundamental level of the courtroom, where the realization
of justice relies heavily on the lawyer’s persuasive power over the juror. Régine Hollander
investigates the implications of such power in her article, “La justice-spectacle aux États-Unis,”
in which she examines courtroom proceedings through the lens of theatre in order to explore the
extent to which the American Judicial System lends itself to spectacle. Her argument interprets
the lawyer-juror relationship as analogous to the rapport between the theatre stage and its
audience on two levels: first, the lawyer functions as an actor; second, the lawyer behaves as a
producer and dramatist; in both cases, the juror serves as a spectator. Within the postmodernist
framework of Jean Baudrillard’s four image phases, the images presented by the lawyer-as-actor
and the lawyer-as-producer-and-dramatist correspond, respectively, to phase one (representation
of the “real”) and phase two (distortion of the “real”), where the “real” equals the pursuit of
justice. As Hollander shifts her analysis to the courtroom theatre’s onscreen presence, she
engages the term justice-spectacle in order to describe how the theatricality of the lawyer-juror
rapport contributes to the creation of spectacle. Due to the introduction of courtroom-inspired
fiction into law school curricula, the jury trial as “théâtrale par essence” (Hollander 103),
together with the public’s demand for spectacle, fosters a virtual redoubling of sorts, which
ultimately moves the jury trial away from the “real” and toward the spectacular. In order to
explore and contextualize the transition from the courtroom theatre to onscreen spectacle, this
chapter will engage French critiques of the O.J. Simpson trial, which exhibits the lawyer’s use of
performance to seduce the juror and appeal to the American public.
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1.1 Inside the Courtroom Theatre
In her article, “La justice-spectacle aux États-Unis,” Régine Hollander examines the
American jury trial as a theatrical production, where the lawyer functions, on one level, as an
actor who attempts to recreate a series of dramatic events before the juror-spectator. Because the
juror presumably bases his/her verdict solely on the information presented by the lawyer (who,
representing either the defense or the prosecution, must confront the case brought forward by his
adversary), the lawyer’s success—and the verdict—hinges on the ability to persuade. In an
analogous manner to an actor onstage, the lawyer must therefore strive to present the juror with
an account that is at once captivating and believable. Yet the lawyer’s role transcends analogy: in
the courtroom theatre, he/she functions as an actor in a literal sense, as evidenced by the
inclusion of acting classes and mock trials in various American law school curricula. Hollander
explains that acting classes typically endeavor to teach students to “maîtriser leur corps et leur
voix” and to “ménager leurs effets tout en captant l’intérêt d’un auditoire (port de tête, direction
du regard, pose de la voix, distance à maintenir, etc.)” (113). John Simonett, former American
lawyer and one of Hollander’s sources, further elaborates on what he terms the “dramaturgical
approach” to the jury trial, highlighting the emphasis placed on “costumes” in law school
curricula (Simonett 1145). For instance, he explains that female law students are often advised to
“be sure to wear a dark dress” in order to convey a sense of authority whereby they might appear
more convincing (Simonett 1145). In addition to acting classes, Hollander notes that it is not
uncommon for law schools to include courses on the art of storytelling. She cites, for instance, a
seminar at the University of Connecticut School of Law, titled “Law and Popular Storytelling,”
in which “il s’agi[t] de réapprendre [aux étudiants] à utiliser leur imagination et leur créativité de
manière à ce qu’ils sachent raconter une histoire, celle de leur client, lors d’une audience” (109).
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The emphasis on persuasive devices in law schools—and their use of more classical theatre
training—reinforces Hollander’s allegation that the success of the lawyer-as-actor relies on
his/her ability to deliver a compelling performance; but, in the courtroom theatre, the lawyer
controls a good deal more than how he/she communicates.
The actor role assumed by the lawyer constitutes only a small part of a larger role in the
courtroom theatre: the lawyer also functions as a producer—even a dramatist—who, beyond the
persuasive devices of the actor, exercises a certain degree of power over other factors, including
the ‘players,’ in the production. With the ability to specify—with regard to his/her own case—
elements like who will testify, the order in which they will do so, and the questions to which they
will respond, the lawyer’s authority mirrors that of a producer backstage during a play. Such
power, once again, is instilled and reinforced in law school curricula. For instance, Hollander
cites Joe Guastaferro, a professional actor and trial consultant who, in partnership with lawyer
Gerry Spence, conducts mock trials for law students on the West Coast. In his courses,
Guastaferro exceeds what law students might learn in an acting class: beyond actors, he insists
that his students consider themselves producers, as it is they who determine the “déroulement de
l’histoire” that plays out before the juror (Hollander 113). Hollander offers a distinctly theatrical
example of the lawyer-as-producer’s implementation of such control: “lorsqu’ils [les avocats]
préparent leur plaidoirie, ils peuvent choisir entre une explication psychologique ou sociale. La
même alternative existe au théâtre ou au cinéma, où les intrigues sont centrées soit sur les
motivations des personnages (character-driven), soit sur les événements auxquels ils participent
(plot-driven)” (113). John Simonett best explains the extent of control exercised by the lawyeras-producer, the detail of whose account—suggestive of his own experience in the courtroom—
bolsters Hollander’s argument significantly:
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Unquestionably counsel may profitably borrow from the playwright to make dry legal
bones comes alive, to sharpen interest and focus attention on the issues by using the
dramatic devices of exposition, complication, suspense, conflict, crisis and climax. The
opening statement is the exposition which, by not divulging all, creates suspense. The
artful order in which witnesses are called sets up crisis and climax. Conflict, the gist of
any lawsuit, is developed during cross-examination and impeachment. Timing is always
important; to maintain jury interest the climax should not come too soon […] If this all
smacks of manipulation, it is. Like a play, a trial must be produced. (1145)
The “manipulation” noted by Simonett suggests a third dimension of the lawyer’s theatrical role
in the jury trial. According to Hollander, the impact of the lawyer in the courtroom theatre—
most importantly, the implications of the lawyer’s performance with regard to the pursuit of
justice—reaches a precarious level when, rather than merely “borrow from the playwright,” the
lawyer becomes one.
The idea of the lawyer-as-dramatist in the courtroom theatre brings to light the
problematic nature of his/her theatricality with regards to the American pursuit of justice. This
concept is nothing new to law professors or students. Philip Meyer, a law professor at the
University of Texas, reveals that law students regularly debate “whether the criminal trial is
designed to reveal the truth, or whether […] the lawyer’s role is merely to present a compelling
story that best serves his client’s narrow vision” (Hollander 109). While the lawyer is prohibited
from lying in the court of law (and therefore, presumably, does not), he/she assumes the role of
dramatist insofar as the juror’s decision is limited to the information the lawyer puts forth.
Hollander illustrates this role by citing New York University law professor, Anthony
Amsterdam, who welcomes first-year law students with the following exposition:
You are the God of creation. […] When the trial begins, a new cosmos is born. Nothing
exists in that cosmos until you put it there. You create the content, of that cosmos, piece
by piece. At the end of the trial, the jury will decide on the questions of fact on which the
parties are at issue. In doing so, the jury may consider only the contents of the cosmos
which you have created during the trial. If you haven’t created something, it doesn’t
exist. (Hollander 110)
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While Amsterdam is careful to specify that the lawyer’s “creation” is comprised of “questions of
fact,” Hollander criticizes him for what she considers “encouragement à la mégalomanie [dans
lequel] il est bien peu question de quête de la vérité” (110). Hollander further emphasizes that,
in the lawyer’s cosmos, “son talent de contour est déterminant […] d’où la nécessité de
développer l’imagination et la créativité des étudiants de droit” (Hollander 110). Given that the
lawyer’s courtroom objective is to win his/her client’s case, the theatrical endeavor to persuade
the juror—especially given the lawyer’s power over the information put forth and withheld—
seems to suggest that the jury trial hinges on the lawyer’s ability to persuade more so than a
quête de la vérité. It is important to note that, in comparison with the French legal system, the
lawyer’s power as an actor, producer and dramatist is uniquely American. While France does
utilize jury trials, the French lawyer neither appeals directly to jurors, nor calls his/her own
witnesses; rather, he/she speaks to the judge, who then questions witnesses and addresses jurors
(Tomlinson 134-135). In other words, the French nonadversarial system is notably less
dependent on the lawyer’s ability to persuade. It is therefore reasonable to assume that French
law school curricula might place less emphasis on theatrical devices than those in the U.S.
Ultimately, as the American lawyer’s theatrical power in the courtroom increases, his/her
performance before the juror seems to appeal more to emotion than to reason, which renders the
lawyer’s role within the pursuit of justice increasingly precarious.
The relation between the lawyer’s case—presented as an actor, producer, and dramatist—
and the pursuit of justice befits Baudrillard’s image phases as described in Simulacra and
Simulation: the lawyer-as-actor corresponds with phase one (representation of the “real”); the
lawyer-as-producer-and-dramatist corresponds with phase two (distortion of the “real”)
(Baudrillard 6). As an actor, the image presented by the lawyer—while delivered in a persuasive
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manner—functions as a representation of the pursuit of justice. The lawyer-as-actor’s case might
be best understood in comparison with a gothic painting: though, due to factors like brush strokes
and use of color, a gothic painting does not perfectly imitate the object it depicts, it still reflects a
basic reality. In a similar manner, the image presented by the lawyer-as-actor represents the
pursuit of justice despite how colorful (persuasive) his/her depiction. But the first image phase is
short-lived in the courtroom theatre; the lawyer’s case quickly transitions into phase two as
he/she exercises power as a producer and a dramatist. In phase two, the lawyer presents an
image that distorts the pursuit of justice insofar as his/her actions aim to serve the interests of
his/her client more so than to uncover the truth (i.e. whether the defendant committed the crime
in question). The lawyer’s use of distortion comes into play, for example, with regard to his/her
strategic choice of witnesses. In order to set the foundation for a strong defense, it is not
uncommon for the lawyer to call witnesses who, though lacking any special insight regarding the
crime in question, offer a favorable account of the defendant. For instance, in O.J. Simpson’s
murder trial, his defense team opened its case by questioning Simpson’s oldest daughter, Arnelle,
as its first witness. Though Arnelle did claim that her father was distraught over the death of his
ex-wife (an arguably important factor), she offered no substantial knowledge related to the
murders; she did, however, paint a sufficiently endearing, compassionate picture of Simpson. By
engaging witnesses like Arnelle, the lawyer aims to present an image that distorts the pursuit of
justice in order to serve the interest of his/her client. The pursuit of justice still exists behind the
lawyer’s depiction, however; it is simply a “denatured” and “evil appearance,” to use
Baudrillard’s terms (6). In other words, phase two images in the courtroom function like a
funhouse mirror, distorting—sometimes greatly—the pursuit of justice, but reflecting it,
nonetheless.
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Because the lawyer generally assumes the roles of actor, producer, and dramatist in the
same move, the line between phase one and phase two images remains rather obscure throughout
courtroom theatre proceedings. At the same time, it is important to note that a clear line exists
between phase two distortion and the creation of full-blown fiction. While the lawyer-asproducer-and-dramatist remains on the distortion-side of that line, the courtroom theatre does
appear to cross it with its emergence onscreen which, introduced into and recycled by law school
curricula, foretells of a gradual transition from courtroom theatricality to spectacle.

1.2 The Courtroom Theatre Onscreen: Transition into Spectacle
Having motivated countless cinematic and small-screen productions, the American jury
trial is a long-time favorite visual media theme in the United States—a reality largely indebted to
the theatrical nature of courtroom proceedings. In itself, the idea that the courtroom theatre
might inspire fictional, onscreen productions is not problematic. Fascination with crime and
justice is neither an exclusively American nor modern phenomenon—the courtroom scene has
inspired dramatists since Antiquity. However, for Hollander, the public’s interest in the
courtroom theatre is uniquely American insofar as its theatricality is, to a certain extent, written
into the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution’s Sixth Amendment outlines the rights of criminal
defendants, including the right to a public trial before an impartial jury; in other words, through
the lens of Hollander’s analysis, the amendment sanctions the participation of spectators in the
courtroom (“Amendment VI”). Furthermore, the amendment neither prohibits nor permits the
presence of cameras in the courtroom; states maintain the right—granted by the Supreme Court
in 1981—to “experiment” with cameras in trials that play out within their jurisdiction
(“Cameras”). The possibility for live, televised trials in the U.S. marks an important distinction
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between American and French justice, the latter of which prohibits the use of courtroom images
until well past the trial’s conclusion (Barbier 7). Due to its theatrical nature and the allowance of
televised trial coverage (which, in turn, creates heightened public fascination with courtroom
proceedings), the American jury trial lends itself to fiction more readily than jury trials in France.
The creation of trial-inspired fiction then becomes problematic the moment it doubles back and
becomes theatrical inspiration for the budding American lawyer.
American law school curricula often engage cinematic and small-screen depictions of the
jury trial—with an emphasis on the comportment of fictional lawyers— as pedagogical tools,
which at once increases the theatricality of the lawyer and, once again, suggests the distortion of
the pursuit of justice. As fictional representations created for the purpose of entertaining the
public, films and TV shows favor and exaggerate the most dramatic aspects of the jury trial. In
other words, they create a dramatized, distorted image of the courtroom, which is already quite
theatrical on its own. Interestingly, the law professors cited by Hollander indicate full awareness
that such courtroom depictions are not illustrative of reality; yet they continue to use them in the
classroom. For instance, Hollander cites law professor Lawrence Friedman, who asserts that the
representation of the jury trial in “popular culture […] is not, and cannot be taken as, an accurate
mirror of the actual state of living law,” insofar as it neglects banal—yet important—aspects of
justice (Hollander 108). Noting that Friedman, nevertheless, uses popular culture as pedagogy,
Hollander critiques:
Cela n’empêche pas Friedman de se pencher sur la culture populaire, et donc sur le
cinéma, pour étudier la justice. Il est suivi en cela par beaucoup de ses collègues qui, loin
de froncer le sourcil devant la vulgarisation commercial d’un système judiciaire
complexe, en font un terrain d’études privilégié. (Hollander 108-9)
Furthermore, professors like Friedman do not engage cinema and television in order to reveal
how reality is deformed by fiction; on the contrary, they use “la fiction comme modèle” for the
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lawyer in the real-life courtroom in an effort to render him/her “plus efficace, c’est-à-dire plus
persuasive” (Hollander 112). By using fiction to inspire the lawyer from a theatrical perspective,
the theatricality of the courtroom experiences a redoubling of sorts: the lawyer’s theatrics inspire
fiction, which in turn inspires the lawyer to become more theatrical, and teaches him/her how to
use such theatricality to manipulate the juror. Hollander clarifies the problematic nature of this
theatrical redoubling:
Corriger la fiction pour qu’elle reflète la réalité ou corriger la réalité pour qu’elle réponde
à un désir de justice tout autant que la fiction ? Quelle que soit la démarche, aucun
homme de loi américain ne prétend que les films sont un reflet fidèle du système
judiciaire. Pourtant, la plupart aiment se mirer dans le miroir déformant que leur tend le
cinéma. (112)
Hollander’s “miroir déformant” echoes the distortion of Baudrillard’s second image phase, by
which, in this case, the lawyer and popular culture take turns creating and recycling images that
ultimately disfigure the pursuit of justice.
The redoubling of theatricality transitions toward spectacle—where the courtroom theatre
merits Hollander’s term, justice-spectacle—with the advent of networks like Court TV (now
TruTV), which capitalize on the permission of cameras in the courtroom and reveal the public’s
fascination with the courtroom as spectacle. Court TV is an American network that broadcasts
real jury trials; for Hollander, it is the place where “l’exploitation de la justice-spectacle prend
toute son ampleur” (115). While Court TV representatives claim (in an interview with Le
Monde) that the network endeavors to function, above all, as a pedagogical tool, it exhibits a
penchant for especially spectacular trials, which it distorts “pour satisfaire l’appétit de sensations
des consommateurs” (Salles “Court TV”). Le Monde further notes that the network has become
known for broadcasting and prioritizing celebrity trials. On a more fundamental level, Court TV
presents a distorted, dramatized view of the pursuit of justice by only depicting jury trials, which
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are a fairly anomalous occurrence. Court TV’s “distorted view” of justice is, however, well
received by the American public; within one year of its creation in 1991, the network catered to
four million viewers, which would increase to 20 million with its coverage of the O.J. Simpson
trial in 19952 (Salles, “Court TV”). The public’s fascination with the jury trial, spectacularized
by networks like Court TV, suggests a redoubling of justice-spectacle that contributes to that of
courtroom theatricality: entertained by the theatrical nature of the jury trial, the public tunes in to
its “real” depictions, which contributes to and increases the public’s fascination with the
courtroom; TV and film producers take note and use such images to inspire fiction; finally, said
fiction is introduced into law school curricula to teach the lawyer to become more theatrical. The
theatricality of the courtroom and the public’s appetite for spectacle therefore ultimately reflect
and perpetuate one another.
The cycle forged by courtroom theatricality and the societal consumption of spectacle
constitutes an important step in the direction of hyperreality—a step characterized by a metatheatrical transition: with its entrance into the domain of spectacle, the jury trial moves outward
from the juror-spectator observing the lawyer inside the courtroom to the American public
watching—as spectators—courtroom coverage on television. This transition and its effects
emerge in the critical reporting on American trials by French journalists, who comment on the
lawyer’s theatricality, the impact of his/her use of drama on the pursuit of justice, and the trials’
movement into spectacle.
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Due to Court TV’s re-launch as part of TruTV in 2008—a reality network that, while still
dedicating airtime to jury trials, now includes various other shows unrelated to justice—exact
data regarding the popularity of its current trial coverage is unclear.
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1.3 O.J. Simpson and the “Dream Team”
In his book, L’Amérique m’inquiète, Jean-Paul Dubois notes that, due to his successful
football career, O.J. Simpson was “le personnage le plus populaire du pays” prior to being
charged with double-homicide (109). Given his celebrity and wealth—which enabled him to
enlist America’s most successful, expensive (read: crafty) lawyers for his defense team—it is
hardly surprising that the trial translated to enthralling television. The trial’s small-screen
prevalence in the U.S. and the public engagement it fostered—the Ford Bronco chase, described
by one French journalist as Simpson’s “odyssée en direct sur les autoroutes de Los Angeles,”
entertained 95 million television viewers—are responsible for initiating most of the French
journalistic interest in the trial (Kauffmann, “Prétoire”). Prior to exploring the French
perspective on the Simpson trial as spectacle, which will be examined in depth in Chapter 2, the
French perspective concerning courtroom theatricality is worth surveying.
Each of Simpson’s six lawyers—who comprised the “Dream Team,” deemed as such due
to their previous success in the (otherwise presumably doomed) trials of other celebrities—were
theatrical to the tune of $4,000 per hour, which suggests that they proved truly masterful actors,
producers, and dramatists. Sylvie Kauffmann, a reporter for Le Monde who covered the
Simpson trial from start to finish, observes the behavior of one of Simpson’s lead lawyers at the
beginning of the trial: “Bob Shapiro se comporte avec lui [Simpson] comme on le fait avec une
victime profondément traumatisée, lui pose une main rassurante sur l’épaule lorsque le juge
l’interroge et tient les reporters scrupuleusement au courant de l’évolution de son moral”
(“Prétoire”). Kauffmann goes on to insinuate that Shapiro’s behavior is purely theatrical, noting
that “ce prévenu traité avec tant d’égards” is in actuality a celebrity who, far from a “victim,”
had only just finished entertaining the masses with an epic car chase (“Prétoire”). Dubois also
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invokes Shapiro’s acting and penchant for drama, criticizing the lawyer’s use of race as a way to
craft a victimized image of Simpson for the jury: “Il faut l’entendre pour le croire. Shapiro, le
lézard des palaces, la diva de Beverly Hills, jouant le ghetto contre le gotha. Filou, il peaufine
son personnage” (114). It is noteworthy, as well, that Dubois’ use of the term “personnage” is
not coincidentally theatrical; in addition to titling the chapter of his book dedicated to the trial,
“Simpson’s Circus”—(is a circus not, essentially, a highly produced performance?)—Dubois
consistently refers to the trial as “une comédie,” complete with other “personnages” who interact
on/in “la scène.” His use of theatre terms echoes Hollander’s notion of the lawyer’s role in the
courtroom theatre; but most of all, it insinuates an assumption that lawyers in the Simpson case
are far more interested in offering up a performance than pursuing justice.
Though the manipulation on Shapiro’s part is noteworthy, it is certainly not limited to the
defense: in another article, Kauffman describes the prosecution’s creation and use of drama in
order to develop an “image” of Simpson to be “implantée dans l’esprit des jurés” (“O.J. et les
autres”). She notes, for instance, the prosecutor’s questioning of Denise Brown, sister of the
slain Nicole Brown, whose highly emotional testimony was ultimately manipulated in order to
create a dramatic effect: “Intensité dramatique maximale: pour permettre au témoin de reprendre
ses esprits, le procureur demanda alors, et obtint, l’ajournement du procès jusqu’au lundi,
laissant les jurés passer le week-end sous le coup de cette émouvante déposition” (“O.J. et les
autres”). Kauffmann appears convinced that, rather than a benevolent act meant to benefit the
witness, the prosecutor’s request for recess was merely a ploy to leave the jury with a compelling
image in mind. The use of such devices provokes Kauffman to insist that the Simpson trial,
“plus qu’aucun autre, […] révèle la puissance des avocats dans le système judiciaire américain,”
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where they are notably more theatrical and manipulative than their French counterparts (“O.J. et
les autres”).
For Kauffman and Dubois, the lawyer’s theatricality in the Simpson trial is perhaps most
disconcerting with regard to their awareness—and exploitation—of cameras inside the
courtroom. Kauffman describes the prosecution’s theatricality, which suggests an endeavor to
put on a show: “le procureur général occupe une charge élective et adore les cameras, l’avocat
général, une jeune femme énergique, est en passe de devenir une star et le sera sans aucun doute
d’ici la fin du procès” (“Prétoire”). Dubois also references the prosecutor general’s awareness of
and appeal to her ‘spectators’ outside the courtroom—the public, which he terms “un jury
fantôme” (115). In response to a media-executed, mid-trial public poll that deemed her
appearance and behavior too austere, the prosecutor—who clearly understood that, with cameras
present, “chaque détail compte”—reappeared in court the following week ‘méconnaissable:’
“cheveux courts, maquillée, tailleur blanc cintré, elle sourit à bout de champ et plaisante avec le
président Ito ” (Dubois 115). Later, she would shorten her skirts at the bequest, once again, of
the « jury fantôme ». For Dubois, the costume change was simply an endeavor to seduce the real
jury—to sway the verdict—and to entertain the “jury fantôme,” perhaps in the hopes of securing
post-trial fame.
Unfortunately for the prosecutor general, her costume-overhaul was in vain as, given that
Simpson was ultimately found innocent, the “Dream Team” seems to have proved more adept at
playing to the cameras. Fully aware of imminent opportunities for exploitation—which he was
sure to secure, thanks to the courtroom cameras—Shapiro enlisted the services of a multimedia
agent before the trial even began in order to “négocier les droits d’un livre et d’un film télé sur le
procès” (Dubois 114). As bent as Dubois clearly is on outing Shapiro’s manipulative tactics,
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Shapiro effectively revealed himself before the Simpson trial ever began by publishing an essay
titled, “Using the Media to Your Advantage,” in which he shamelessly acknowledges the benefit
of performing for the cameras in order to contribute to what Kauffmann terms “une frénésie
médiatique” (“Prétoire”). Shapiro’s essay is worth noting, here, as it illustrates his use of
theatrics to craft a more spectacular image for courtroom cameras. The lawyer’s use of the
media will be explored in Chapter two.

***
The presence of cameras inside the courtroom constitutes a pivotal element in the
American jury trial’s movement towards hyperreality in two ways. First, the introduction of
cameras marks the trial’s entrance into the domain of onscreen spectacle, which will eventually
translate to Guy Debord’s neo-Marxist notion of spectacle as the ultimate expression of
consumer capitalism and an all-consuming element of postmodern American society. Debord’s
notion of spectacle—tied to mediated images—will ultimately lay the groundwork for
hyperreality. Second, the permission of cameras in the courtroom—notably the diffusion of
images prior to the trial’s conclusion—serves as a significant point of differentiation between
French and American jury trials. The American public would likely exhibit far less (if any)
fascination with—and encouragement of—lawyer theatricality were it not for the trial coverage
of networks like Court TV and that of media outlets (to be examined in Chapter two). The
impact of such televised images on the public’s engagement in jury trials is evidenced in the fact
that, while millions of viewers tuned in to the Simpson trial in 1995, the Nielsen Rating of
courtroom trials in the 1960s was quite low, and audience attendance inside the actual courtroom
was even lower—a trend that corresponded with notable legal ambiguity regarding the presence
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of cameras in the courtroom (Simonett 1145). Given that the French judicial system prohibits
current trial coverage, it stands to reason that the self-perpetuating cycle of courtroom
theatricality and spectacle exhibited by the American jury trial would never come to pass in
France; hence the French interest in and critique of cases like that of Simpson, where lawyers
appealed to spectators outside the courtroom in order to secure the exoneration of a defendant
who was, in all actuality, probably guilty. But the lawyer is not solely to blame for distorting the
pursuit of justice; the media has its own part to play—chiefly that of spectacularizing jury trial
images in order to serve its own interests.
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CHAPTER 2: Mediated Spectacle, Consumer Capitalism, and the Absence of the “Real”
Beyond depictions of the courtroom in cinema and small-screen drama, images of the
jury trial transmitted by the media—thanks to events like the “perp walk” and the permission of
cameras in the courtroom—situate American justice within the domain of Guy Debord’s neoMarxist notion of spectacle. In Society of the Spectacle, Debord characterizes spectacle as “a
social relation among people, mediated by images” (Debord 6) that occurs within postmodern,
consumer capitalist culture, like that of United States. In such a society, capitalism reaches its
“absolute fulfillment” in spectacle, where it assumes the form of an image (Debord 36). While
Debord’s revolutionary Neo-Marxism contrasts with Baudrillard’s nihilism regarding
postmodern society, the transition of mediated jury trial images into Debord’s realm of spectacle
can be taken to correspond with their movement into Baudrillard’s third image phase, both of
which ultimately funnel into hyperreality. In the third image phase, the media spectacularizes
images of the jury trial, masking the absence of the pursuit of justice, which has been replaced by
the pursuit of spectacle. From a sociological perspective, Pierre Bourdieu examines the
implications of mediated spectacle in his book, On Television, where he explores both the
media’s use of spectacle for its own capital gain and the demand for spectacle by American
consumers. In order to illustrate spectacle’s consumer capitalist role in jury trial mediation, this
chapter will feature the French perspective on the Dominique Strauss-Kahn affair, whose
spectacular “perp walk” provoked outrage across France, and the O.J. Simpson trial, which
illustrated the “spectacular” impact of consumer capitalism on the pursuit of justice.
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2.1 Mediated Spectacle-as-Capital
Debord explains his notion of spectacle from a Neo-Marxist perspective, in which he ties
the rise of spectacle to that of consumer capitalism. Spectacle is an expression of capitalism in
its most complete form; as such, spectacle, like capitalism, corresponds to the erosion of use
value. In order to understand Debord’s spectacle as a step toward hyperreality (and to avoid
hopping down a Marxist rabbit trail), use value—a product’s primary, material use—can be
taken to correspond with Baudrillard’s “real.” With the rise of consumer capitalism, “everything
that was directly lived has moved away into representation”—use value is replaced by sign
value, the totality of which is spectacle. In Debord’s words, “spectacle is capital to such a
degree of accumulation that it becomes an image” (34; original emphasis). The hallmark of
spectacle is its consumption of and by society. Debord explains: “The spectacle is the moment
when the commodity [its sign value] has attained the total occupation of social life. Not only is
the relation to the commodity visible but it is all one sees: the world one sees is its world” (42;
original emphasis). Furthermore, spectacle instills in its conquered society an insatiable craving
for more spectacle (hence the “consumer” in consumer capitalism), whereby it insures its own
perpetuity. Via its “shimmering diversions,” which become standard in the “society of the
spectacle,” spectacle captivates consumers and diverts their attention from the “real” (use value),
all the while conditioning them to seek the spectacular everywhere, which ultimately fosters
what Debord calls the “banalization” of everyday life (59). In other words, consumers in the
“society of the spectacle” grow bored of—and gradually disconnect from—the “real.” This
hyperreal power to divert attention away from the “real” finds “its most glaring superficial
manifestation” in the media, whose penchant for sensationalism as a way to appeal to consumer
capitalism makes it especially suited to the perpetuation of spectacle (24). Though Debord never

26

	
  
uses the term “hyperreal,” his theory successfully establishes spectacle and capitalism as
fundamental components of hyperreality, and his notion of spectacle will come to correspond to
Baudrillard’s third and (eventually) fourth image phases. Prior to situating spectacle within
Baudrillard’s theoretical framework, however, it is useful to explore present-day manifestations
of spectacle in the media.
Debord’s theory is echoed in Bourdieu’s On Television, in which he examines the
media’s penchant for—and the public’s consumption of—spectacle from a sociological
perspective. For Bourdieu, the media and the public share a cyclical relationship, characterized
by “symbolic violence […] wielded with tacit complicity between its victims and its agents,”
(17) by which both parties perpetuate spectacle. While the media is responsible for transmitting
spectacular images, spectacle, being consumer capitalist in nature, requires the compliance of
consumers in order to thrive. In a “world ruled by the fear of being boring,” as Bourdieu
observes, the media-public relationship constitutes a question of the supply of and demand for
the sensational; or, in Debord’s language, mediated spectacle functions as both a cause and effect
of the “banalization” of real life, by which the public develops an insatiable appetite for the
spectacular that perpetually regenerates the fear of the banal (Bourdieu 2; Debord 59). This fear
translates to news networks’ seemingly endless endeavor to entertain, rather than educate, which
explains the subsequent journalistic obsession with “scoops.” In order to appeal to viewers
(consumers), media outlets award a disproportionate amount of attention to spectacle, of which
sensational news is, Bourdieu assures, “an easy example” whose favorite themes include “blood,
sex, melodrama and crime” (17).
The preference awarded to sensational news is very easily observable in the context of
American justice. Like Court TV’s special penchant for celebrity jury trials (described in
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chapter 1), news networks favor particularly spectacular trials, which typically involve either a
celebrity or an especially shocking, grotesque crime (or both). But the media does more than
merely seize the opportunity to broadcast spectacular events; in the absence of truly dazzling
manifestations of spectacle, news networks cast a spectacular light on otherwise banal (or
serious, as the case may be) events by cherry-picking their most entertaining elements. As an
illustration, Bourdieu describes reporting on an earthquake in Turkey. Rather than dedicate
valuable air-time to a discussion of “subtle, nuanced changes or processes” related to the event—
like continental drift, or its long-term, socioeconomic implications—news outlets prefer to
broadcast a series of “flash photos” and brief comments that focus on havoc (6-7). In the
“society of the spectacle,” the media must, essentially, endeavor to “interest everybody without
touching on anything important,” because “important” events relate too closely to the “use
value” from which spectacle is disengaged (Bourdieu 18).
When examined within the specific context of the jury trial, the media demonstrates a
more advanced and precarious level of spectacularization: beyond merely highlighting
spectacular elements (like the lawyer’s theatrics or death-tolls in Turkey), news outlets create
spectacle by bombarding the public with images of a particular trial until it subsequently
becomes spectacular. Casey Anthony’s indictment is an excellent example of a trial-turnedmediated-spectacle. An otherwise unremarkable person, Anthony was charged in 2011 with the
murder of her three-year-old daughter. While infanticide is certainly noteworthy, the public
frenzy over her trial—it caused the biggest public stir since O.J. Simpson—was far more
indebted to the media’s over-the-top trial coverage than to the grotesque or rare nature of her
crime. In an interview with Le Monde, Lawson Lamar, a prosecutor in the Anthony trial,
emphasizes the extent of the trial’s spectacularization by noting the existence of other less
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mediated cases of infanticide. For Lamar, the sole reason the Anthony affair incited more
outrage than other similar cases “est que les médias n’ont pas attiré la lumière sur eux” (Chetrit,
“Casey Anthony acquittée”). The Anthony trial and its extensive—ultimately hyperreal—
mediation will be examined in depth in chapter three. However, in addition to illustrating the
media’s ability to mold a terrible, yet fairly unspectacular, event into full-blown spectacle, the
Anthony trial exemplifies spectacle’s inherent capitalism, whereby networks and journalists
profit from the spectacularization of jury trials.
Consumer capitalism and mediated spectacle drive one another in two primary ways:
first, news outlets spectacularize events in order to make more money; second, thanks to said
spectacularization, individual journalists and anchors become media “stars” with their own,
spectacular celebrity. Revenue for media outlets is tied directly to its number of viewers, which,
in turn, correlates with ratings; as ratings increase, so does the worth of airtime, which increases
the price at which networks might sell ad space. In other words, for news networks, the ability to
entertain and captivate viewers makes money. During its exhaustive coverage of the Anthony
trial, for instance, HLN’s ratings increased 12%, and an average of 4.57 million viewers—a
record for HLN—tuned in to witness Nancy Grace—former prosecutor turned celebrity news
anchor— berate Anthony’s acquittal (Stelter). Furthermore, the network’s trial coverage
contributed to a 9% profit increase for CNN (its ‘parent’ network), which pulled in an estimated
$196.3 million in ad revenue in that year (Gillette, “Hungry for Ads”). In this way, viewer
ratings essentially “impose the sales model” on news, according to Bourdieu, which is
problematic because, in encouraging spectacle, it discourages reporting on less sensational—but
more important—events (27). “Star” journalists and news anchors exemplify the impact of this
“sales model” most obviously, as their celebrity is more tangible than network ratings and
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revenue. Named “capitalistic entrepreneurs” by Bourdieu, the capital gained by media “stars”
depends on their onscreen visibility, which is, like network ratings, tied to their ability to present
sensational news (6). While media “stars” are not exclusively an American phenomenon,
Bourdieu notes the difference in salary between the American media “star” and his/her European
equivalent: the former is salaried to the tune of several million dollars, while the latter typically
earns a salary in the $100,000 range (6). This seems to suggest that consumer capitalism is,
perhaps, an especially American aspect of spectacle. Money aside, media “stars” perpetuate
spectacle by becoming spectacle in their own right. For instance, Nancy Grace’s celebrity is
arguably just as spectacular as her jury trial images, if not more so, due to her angry tirades and
fondness for renaming defendants (Casey Anthony is now largely known as “Tot Mom”).
Spectacularization by “star” reporters like Grace—lucrative for both networks and individual
“stars”—illustrates Debord’s theory of the perpetuation of spectacle-as-capital and affirms the
media’s role as its chief manifestation.

2.2 Mediated Spectacle and the Absence of the “Real”
The media’s appeal to consumer capitalism via the perpetuation of spectacle can be
understood within the framework of Baudrillard’s third image phase, in which mediated jury trial
images mask the absence of the pursuit of justice, or the “real.” Whereas the lawyer-asproducer-and-dramatist presents an image that distorts the pursuit of justice (but reflects it,
nonetheless), the jury trial image presented by the media does not reflect the pursuit of justice;
rather, it spectacularizes the image for its own capital gain, then presents it under the guise of an
obligation to inform the public. This process involves what Baudrillard terms “dissimulation,”
which distinguishes the media’s action in phase three from the “simulation” that will characterize
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phase four. According to Baudrillard, “to dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one has”
(Simulacra and Simulation 3). In the third image phase, the media dissimulates (masks) the
absence of the pursuit of justice by filling the void with spectacle, ultimately crafting the illusion
that it serves the good of the public. The media achieves the latter via a second level of
dissimulation—that of spectacle—in which it bombards viewers with (spectacular) jury trial
images in order to make them appear to constitute crucially important—rather than sensational—
news. In other words, spectacle preserves and regenerates itself by dissimulating itself as such.
This principle is reflected in Bourdieu’s discussion of media spectacularization, in which he
appears to connect Baudrillard’s third image phase with Debord’s explanation of spectacle’s
“shimmering diversions.” Bourdieu explains that “sensationalism attracts notice, and it also
diverts it, like magicians whose basic operating principle is to direct attention to something other
than what they’re doing” (17-18). It is important to clarify that, while the spectacular, mediated
jury trial images in phase three do not reflect the pursuit of justice, they do not (yet) constitute its
simulation. In phase three, the distinction between the “real” pursuit of justice and the
spectacularized mediated images, however well masked, remains intact, whereas “simulation
threatens the difference between the “true” and the “false,” the “real” and the “imaginary”
(Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation 3). By directing the public’s attention toward
spectacular images in phase three, the media effectively conceals the absence of the pursuit of
justice while replacing it with the pursuit of spectacle.
The media’s use of spectacle to hide the absence of the “real” is exemplified by its
images of the “perp walk,” which the media passes off as fulfillment of an obligation to inform
the public. The “perp walk”—short for “perpetrator walk”—refers to the practice—orchestrated
by police departments and media outlets—in which an alleged perpetrator is handcuffed and
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escorted by police officers to and from the courthouse and/or precinct, during which process
he/she is paraded before an audience of journalists who capture the event in images. The only
real information conveyed by “perp walk” mediation is news of an accusation and subsequent
arrest—news the media could deliver just as (if not more) easily without the use of images.
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the media’s use of “perp walk” images is not, in fact,
motivated by an endeavor to inform the public. Rather, the “perp walk” serves the exclusive
purpose of spectacle, which explains why the practice is typically reserved for high-profile
defendants. (Viewers are far more captivated by the arrest of, say, a wealthy French politician,
than that of an every-day member of the working class.) Furthermore, in contributing to
spectacle, mediated images of the “perp walk” undermine the pursuit of justice by broadcasting
incriminating images of the defendant—handcuffed and surrounded by cops—before allowing
for due process of law. French Journalist Laura Raim, who covered the Dominique StraussKahn trial, refers to “perp walk” mediation as a form of “lynchage médiatique” that
compromises the presumption of innocence—a central premise in both American and French
justice (Raim, “Affaire DSK”). The media’s use of such spectacular, judicially precarious
images strongly suggests the presence of spectacle and the absence of the pursuit of justice,
which situates the “perp walk” within Baudrillard’s third image phase. Furthermore, the “perp
walk” constitutes a clear point of differentiation between French and American judicial
reporting. Beyond criticizing the “perp walk’s” tendency to compromise the presumption of
innocence, the French media system abides by the “loi Guigou,” which prohibits the
transmission of incriminating images of a defendant prior to the end of his/her trial
(Legifrance.gouv.fr, “Loi 2000-516”). Ultimately, examined from the perspective of both

32

	
  
Baudrillard and modern French law, the mediated “perp walk” seems to suggests that the phrase,
“society of the spectacle,” is notably more descriptive of the United States than of France.
French criticism of the American media’s penchant for spectacle is exemplified by
French reporting on the trials of O.J. Simpson, Casey Anthony, and Dominique Strauss-Kahn.
This chapter will close with an examination of Dominique-Strauss Kahn’s “perp walk,”
illustrative of spectacle’s displacement of the pursuit of justice, followed by the highly
sensationalized Simpson “circus,” which demonstrates the extent to which spectacle intertwines
with consumer capitalism to the detriment of the pursuit of justice. The ever-spectacular
Anthony trial will be examined in chapter three.

2.3 Dominique Strauss-Kahn and the “Perp Walk”
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund and a leading candidate for the
2012 French presidency, Dominique Strauss-Kahn was indicted on May 19, 2011 for the alleged
sexual assault and attempted rape of Sofitel New York Hotel maid, Nafissatou Diallo. While
both French and American reporting considered the political implications of his arrest for France,
his “perp walk,” in particular, provoked an overwhelming amount of negative attention from
French reporters and intellectuals, who claimed that the highly mediated event undermined the
presumption of innocence. The DSK “perp walk” further incited a nation-wide debate in France
regarding the legal implications of the French media’s retransmission of American “perp walk”
images, which had already “gone viral” on a global scale.
French journalists largely viewed the mediated images of DSK’s “perp walk” as a
“frénésie [et] exécution médiatique” that at once humiliated and criminalized him, ultimately
undermining the American (and French) judicial premise that one is innocent until proven guilty
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(Garrigos, “Presse et télés”). Laura Raim, for instance, describes the French as “scandalisés” by
the incriminating images of DSK, and portrays the “perp walk” in the following way: “Entre la
sortie du commissariat et l’exhibition devant le tribunal de New York, le tout offert à l’oeil avide
des cameras, il est évident que tout a été organisé, planifié et orchestré pour donner l’image d’un
homme condamné par avance” (“Affaire DSK: les médias”). This description of anticipatory,
“orchestrated” condemnation by the “avid” media and the public illustrates that the “perp walk”
acts exclusively in the interest of spectacle, and heavily implies the absence of the pursuit of
justice. Le Point reinforces Raim’s portrayal by framing its condemnation of the “perp walk”
within the larger argument that “les images sont des piloris modernes” (Agence France-Presse
(AFP), “L’affaire DSK: les temps des questions). Furthermore, the same article suggests that, as
an unnecessary addition to jury trial reporting, such incriminating images imply “une forme de
double peine.” The use of the phrase “double peine” seems to suggest that DSK was subjected to
both the American court of law and that of public opinion, the latter relying exclusively on
images. Renaud Dély reiterates the spectacular nature of the DSK affair by suggesting that jury
trial coverage within the “système judiciaro-médiatique américain” constitutes a “mise en scène
permanente”—a “grand show indécent” that is symbolized by the sensational “perp walk”
(“DSK: les médias en ont-ils trop fait?”).
In his article for Le Point, titled “Affaire Strauss-Kahn: question de principe,” journalist
and intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy presents a similar argument from a more analytical
perspective, underpinning his examination of the DSK “perp walk” with the idea that American
culture is consumed by spectacle. Like other French journalists, Lévy claims that the American
media—especially the tabloids—undermines the pursuit of justice by transmitting incriminating
images along with its own, unfounded judgment. He begins his article with the assertion that the
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DSK “perp walk” “fut une humiliation délibérée et ne servait en rien l’établissement de la
vérité.” Furthermore, Lévy argues that, in broadcasting images of DSK in handcuffs, “on a fait
comme si [DSK] était déjà coupable et on a donc portée atteinte au principe, pilier de toute
justice, de la présomption d’innocence.” He goes on to specifically attack tabloids, like The
Daily News, that accompany such images with the blatant and premature presumption of guilt.
Lévy explains: “Je maintiens que les tabloïds qui, dès la première minute et avant que l’on sache
rien de sa version des faits ni mêmes des faits tout court, ont traité Strauss-Kahn de ‘pervers’ [et]
se sont érigés en juges à la place des juges—ce qui est une infraction, de nouveau, aux plus
élémentaires règles de droit.” By casting judgment based entirely on opinion (and spectacular
images), the media’s coverage of DSK and his “perp walk” appear, for Lévy, to reflect the
pursuit of spectacle rather than justice. Furthermore, Lévy highlights the “perp walk’s” unfair
penchant for celebrity defendants. He explains: “Je maintiens qu’arguer d’une épreuve qui serait
‘la même pour tous’ est une fumisterie double d’une hypocrisie car il n’y a pas, pour tous, à la
sortie de tous les commissariats américains, les mêmes haies de chasseurs d’images envoyant,
dans le monde entier, les clichés de leur homme menotté, déjà déconsidéré.” Throughout his
article, Lévy’s observations suggest an acute awareness of the displacement of the pursuit of
justice by spectacle in the American media.
In a second article, titled “Les cinq leçons de la non-affaire Strauss-Kahn,” Lévy
examines the spectacular nature of the DSK trial images in theoretical terms that seem to directly
reference Debord. The very first of Lévy’s “cinq leçons” is “la cannibalisation de la Justice par
le Spectacle,” which he explains as the “façon de noyer l’établissement patient de la vérité sous
un flot d’images dignes d’un mauvais reality show.” Though Lévy does clarify that the societal
consumption by and of spectacle is not uniquely American, he immediately stresses that, in the
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context of justice, the “perp walk” distinguishes the United States from other postmodern
cultures. Lévy describes the “perp walk” as a media-produced “mise en scène” in which subjects
are dehumanized for the sake of spectacle; as such, it constitutes “un sommet d’obscénité” in
postmodern society. In the context of the DSK affair, “dehumanization” refers to the reduction
of DSK and his accuser to symbols—the rich, powerful, white man and the poor, mistreated,
immigrant woman. For Lévy, this serves to simplify the affair in order to make it more
digestible for the everyday consumer of mediated spectacle, who favors undialectical,
spectacular generalization.3 The dehumanization inherent in the media’s jury trial images echoes
spectacle’s ability to divert attention away from the “real” and foreshadows its gradual transition
towards hyperreality.
DSK’s “perp walk” enlivened a debate among French journalists and intellectuals
regarding the media’s obligation to inform the public, which reveals fundamental differences in
American and French trial mediation. In an interview with Libération, law professor Jean
Cédras, discusses the French disapproval of DSK’s treatment by the American media, citing the
French “loi Guigou,” which prohibits the media from showing images that might incriminate a
defendant prior to the trial’s resolution (Bonal, “DSK: la prison, le grand jury et après?”).
American justice, according to Cédras, contrasts sharply with the “loi Guigou,” as the very
images the latter aims to discourage constitute an integral aspect of the American media’s
intersection with justice. He explains that, in the U.S., “les juges et les procureurs sont élus,
donc en quête de notoriété pour leur réélection.” In other words, in addition to serving the
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  The term, “undialectical” is used in opposition to Terry Eagleton’s notion of “dialectical”
thought. He defines it in the following way: “[dialectical thought is] a response to a certain
embarrassment. Dialectical thought arises because it is less and less possible to ignore the fact
that civilization, in the very act of realizing some human potentials, also damagingly suppresses
others.” (The Idea of Culture, 23)
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media’s penchant for spectacle, sensational “perp walk” images benefit courtroom players. In
this way, the “perp walk,” according to Cédras, “fait partie de la règle du jeu aux Etats-Unis, où
la notion de présomption d’innocence s’applique surtout au moment du procès.” Furthermore,
he claims that, for Americans, the “perp walk” is typically “perçu comme faisant partie du jeu
démocratique et du devoir d’information.”
While the French system opposes the notion that the “perp walk” satisfies the media’s
obligation to inform the public, a number of French media outlets aired American mediated
images of DSK’s “perp walk” in spite of the “loi Guigou,” which some justified by citing “la
mondialisation des images [qui] rend assez absurd l’application d’une telle loi” (Berretta,
“Affaire DSK: coup de semonce”). Others argued that, because the image was American and the
trial was not in France, not showing it simply because it depicted a French person would have
been hypocritical and unnecessary, given the media’s obligation to inform the public and the “loi
Guigou’s” national jurisdiction (AFP, “Images de DSK menotté”). However, others, like Richard
Malka, condemned French outlets that aired the “perp walk” images, asserting that “le droit à
l’information n’est pas celui du droit à l’humiliation” (Coex, “Le droit à l’information”).
Furthermore, he claims that the “loi Guigou” applies to the DSK images despite their global
“hypermédiatisation,” or the fact that the trial took place in the U.S., since its objective includes
the prevention of “la diffusion d’images qui portent atteinte à la dignité de l’homme,” and DSK’s
dignity surely suffered as a result of his “perp walk.” Ultimately, the incriminating “perp walk”
images of DSK cornered the French media “entre la loi qui prohibe ces images et le devoir ou le
droit d’informer” (Berrette, “DSK menotté, des poursuites possibles”). Regardless of whether
French media outlets were justified in diffusing the American image of DSK, the fact that the
images were so heavily debated by French journalists and intellectuals is noteworthy.
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The French outrage concerning the DSK “perp walk” indicates an awareness of the
American penchant for spectacle, and its precarious implications regarding the pursuit of justice.
Furthermore, the subsequent debate over the role of the media in France seems to suggest a
dialectical approach to culture—and ultimately to justice—that contrasts with the comparatively
undialectical consumption of spectacularized images that characterizes consumers within the
“society of the spectacle.” This is not to propose, however, that all Americans support the “perp
walk;” but it is noteworthy that, those who do, usually acknowledge that the U.S. had not
conveyed “anywhere near [the] level of outrage” expressed by the French during the DSK affair
(Cohen, “DSK Fallout: Time for the Perp Walk to take a Hike?”).

2.4 The O.J. Simpson Trial and Capital Gain
Often called the “trial of the century,” the Simpson murder trial is among the most
publicized criminal trials in American history. The media’s relentless reporting captivated the
public via live coverage of trial proceedings, talk shows, “expert” opinions and, of course, the
now infamous Ford Bronco chase, described by Jean-Paul Dubois in L’Amérique m’inquiète as a
“burlesque road-movie” (114). Along with the countless viewers who tuned-in to (and therefore
participated in) the “fièvre médiatique,” Simspson’s already well-established (now evergrowing) celebrity engaged admirers who sent him gifts and fan mail while he was in prison
(Kauffmann, “Prétoire de stars à Los Angeles”). Perhaps the only element of the Simpson trial
as remarkable as its hyper-mediation was the extent to which it was exploited to capitalist ends.
The media’s profit was perhaps the most obvious; thanks to increased viewer ratings, ABC, for
instance, sold its ad space at a 470% price increase during the trial coverage (Dubois 120).
American spectators also capitalized on the event via the sale of Simpson murder paraphernalia,
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while Simpson and his lawyers secured book and movie deals after, and even during, the trial.
The role of spectacle in the Simpson trial was not lost on French journalists and intellectuals,
who ultimately brought to light the precarious role of wealth in American justice.
Dubois, along with journalist Sylvie Kauffmann, criticizes the media-instigated public
obsession with Simpson and his trial, placing special emphasis on the spectacular Ford Bronco
chase. Fleeing from the police while holding a gun to his head, Simpson—or “The Juice,” as his
fans called him—put on a show, and the public took the bait. Dubois notes the persistence of the
media, which relentlessly pursued Simpson in the larger pursuit of spectacle. The event’s
mediation paid out; even though the riveting “chase” occurred at a mere 35 miles per hour, its
coverage captivated 95 million television viewers. Dubois goes on to highlight the public’s
engagement in the streets of L.A., where “aux carrefours, comme au plus beau temps de ses
interceptions, la foule acclame le ‘Juice’” (114). In such observations, Dubois emphasizes the
ability of both Simpson’s already-established celebrity and the media’s endless coverage to
create spectacle out of an otherwise anti-climactic event. Furthermore, he asserts that the lowspeed chase accelerated Simpson’s murder allegation to a new, spectacular level: “A partir de là,
l’histoire change de dimension. Un banal fait divers de quartier vient de passer le mur du son et
de l’image. Aspirées dans les turbines médiatiques, les médiocres aventures d’un couple font
soudain plus d’audience que les jeux Olympiques” (114). French journalists echoed Dubois’
sentiments: Sylvie Kauffmann observes that “les moindres développements de l’affaire Simpson
monopolisent les petits écrans, souvent en direct, les “unes” des journaux et les couvertures des
magazines” (“Prétoire de stars à Los Angeles”). Furthermore, given the overwhelming coverage
of the Simpson affair, which began well before the trial, Kauffmann brings to light the potential
impact of mediated spectacle on the pursuit of justice. She wonders: “Au bout de deux semaines,
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les interrogations surgissent: peut-on envisager un procès équitable lorsque le public a été mis au
courant heure par heure des moindres détails de l’enquête, vrais ou faux? Peut-on trouver à Los
Angeles douze jurés qui n’aient pas été influences, d’une manière ou d’une autre, par l’intense
couverture médiatique?” (“Prétoire de stars à Los Angeles”). Kauffmann goes on to criticize
Simpson’s mediated “perp walk,” which, like that of DSK, came off as “une forte présomption
de sa culpabilité.” Dubois’ and Kauffmann’s observations suggest, in similar fashion to French
reporting on the DSK “perp walk,” that the relentless mediation of the Simpson trial was fuelled
by the pursuit of spectacle more so than the pursuit of justice.
Beyond capital gain on the part of media networks, the public’s fascination with the
Simpson spectacle translated to capitalist exploitation on the part of consumers, which supports
Debord’s idea of spectacle-as-capital. Dubois notes, for example, that Nicole Brown’s home
became a popular tourist destination, and the limousine driver who took Simpson to the airport
the day of the murder would quickly sell “aux enchères la-voiture-de-la-nuit-du-crime” (109110). On another, more striking level, Dubois describes consumers whose capitalist ventures not
only demonstrated a grotesque, public fascination with the violent nature of Simpson’s
allegations, but also indicated a consequent increase in his celebrity. First, he references
Lenward Holness II, who visited Simpson in prison to negotiate the right to build and sell, for
$3,395 each, bronze statues of the celebrity holding a football. Dubois quotes Holness, who
justified capitalizing on Simpson’s murder allegations by explaining, “dans la vie, tout le monde
exploite tout le monde” (110). In addition to exploiting Simpson’s celebrity, a store in the
outskirts of L.A. called Ragztop profited from the violence of his alleged crime by advertising
gory panoplies of “The Juice.” Dubois explains the panoplies’ contents, which made for very
“en vogue” gifts: “L’ensemble se compose d’un maillot de football couvert de sang (22 dollars),

40

	
  
d’un couteau (20 dollars), d’un masque en latex du héros (20 dollars) et de la perruque blonde de
Nicole (12 dollars)” (110). Upon asking the store’s owner to specify the typical buyer of the
gory panoplies, he assures Dubois of their universal appeal to consumers, “des types comme
vous et moi, des gens qui vivent sur cette terre” (110). Given Dubois’ observations, a more
precise answer might have been consumers in the “society of the spectacle.”
Capital gain was not limited to every-day spectators of the Simpson affair: the spectacle
opened the possibility of profit to Simpson, his lawyers, and nearly anyone with a connection to
Simpson or the victims. Kauffmann mentions that Simpson’s book, I Want to Tell You, written
in prison and decorated with photos depicting his former life with Nicole, sold nearly 500, 000
copies almost immediately upon its release (“O.J. Simpson et les autres”). Furthermore, Dubois
explains that Simpson foresaw the opportunity to capitalize on his heavily mediated indictment
from inside his prison cell, where he commercialized “lui-même une cassette video de remise en
forme” (110). As mentioned in chapter one, Simpson’s lawyers also predicted the lucrative
nature of the spectacle—evidenced, according to Dubois, by their negotiation of trial-inspired
films and books before the trial even began. Finally, Faye Resnick, best friend of the slain
Nicole Brown, published Private Diary, in which she divulged details of Brown’s private life
with Simpson. Dubois credits the book’s success—it became a best-seller within one week of its
release—to the media’s excessive use of spectacular talk shows, which featured friends and
family of those related to the trial, from Resnick to the judge Ito’s wife, and which served no
purpose outside the perpetuation of spectacle. Dubois summarizes his critique of the consumer
capitalism inherent in the Simpson spectacle in the following way: “On en est là. A ce point
critique d’indignité. Au moment où un billet de spectacle ayant appartenu à O.J. vient d’être
vendu 8000 dollars aux enchères” (115).
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Beyond consumerism, the Simpson “circus” brought to light a new, precarious
intersection of capitalism and justice, which caused French journalists to ponder the capacity of
wealth to buy innocence in the American jury trial. Kaufmann, for example, underscores the
bearing of Simpson’s very highly paid—therefore highly effective—lawyers:
Cet accusé-là n’a peut-être pas d’alibi, mais il est riche et célèbre. A prix d’or, O.J.
Simpson a recruté une armée d’avocats si talentueux qu’on les sent capables de renverser
les meilleurs arguments ; ils ont eu les moyens de faire mener leur propre enquête,
d’interroger les moindres témoins, de faire passer les rapports et les indices au peigne fin
par leurs propres experts. Médiatiquement, ce sont des bulldozers. (“O.J. Simpson et les
autres”)
Simpson’s lawyers further proved themselves to be “masters” of the media by adding to “la
frénésie médiatique par d’incessantes conférences de presse diffuses en direct sur CNN et les
chaînes locales (Kauffmann, “Prétoire de stars à Los Angeles”). In making these observations,
Kauffmann seems to imply that the success of Simpson’s case—in both the court of law and the
court of opinion—was correlated to Simpson’s ability to dispense exorbitant amounts of money
on a top-dollar (and theatrically top-notch) defense team—a factor that would not come into play
in a French courtroom, where the lawyer has a far smaller impact on jurors. Dubois agrees with
Kauffmann’s implication, which he makes quite clear by asserting that “le procès Simpson est
bien une extravagance de riches” (118). To illustrate his point, Dubois compares the Simpson
trial, which spanned 74 days and cost an estimated nine million dollars, to a more modest trial in
Santa Monica. At the start of the Simpson trial, James Foster, “un Noir qui n’avait jamais joué
au golf de sa vie,” was charged with killing his wife, a white, 29-year-old woman who wanted a
divorce. Foster was defended by a single, state-appointed attorney, and at the end of a five-day
trial costing $500, he was found guilty (117). The French reaction to the spectacular cost of the
Simpson trial can be summarized by a single statement, published in le Monde in response to the
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celebrity’s acquittal: “La grande leçon de ce procès, c’est que l’argent peut acheter la justice”
(Dubois 118). From the French perspective, the intermingling of lawyer theatrics, spectacle, and
consumer capitalism in U.S. jury trial mediation appears to undermine the pursuit of justice.

***

As a “society of the spectacle,” most of America’s mediated jury trial images constitute,
to some extent, a departure from the “real” pursuit of justice. The most circulated images of
DSK, for instance, happened to be at once the most spectacular and least important with regard
to his trial. As for the Simpson “circus,” the two hours of nonstop, live coverage of the 35 mile
per hour Ford Bronco chase corrupted the pursuit of justice in order to entertain viewers. In a
similar fashion, HLN’s exhaustive reporting on the Anthony affair crafted full-blown spectacle
from an otherwise fairly unremarkable event. Beyond the mere absence of the pursuit of justice,
it is not uncommon for media outlets to jazz-up their trial reporting with speculation—usually
from “expert” panelists, friends and family of defendants or victims, or “star” journalists and
anchors. The moment the media broadcasts such speculation as news, it transitions from
presenting an image that masks the absence of the “real” to projecting an image that simulates it,
thereby entering the postmodern realm of hyperreality.
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CHAPTER 3: Mediated Speculation and Hyperreality
When projected in the form of speculation, mediated jury trial images advance to
Baudrillard’s fourth and final image phase, where they constitute pure simulacra; as such, they
surpass the dissimulation of the absence of the “real” to lose reference to—and ultimately
eliminate—the “real” altogether. A simulacrum can be understood as a copy without an original;
it constitutes the simulation, rather than representation, of the “real”—a “hyperreal” comprised
of “the generation by models of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard 1). In the context of
the jury trial, mediated speculation—the projection of an opinion—possesses no relation to the
“real” pursuit of justice; rather, the media creates its own “hyperreal” pursuit of justice that
incessantly refers to—and thereby regenerates—itself as a point of reference. While viewers in
phase three perpetuate spectacle by maintaining a demand for it, the hyperreality of phase four
entails an implosion of the media and its viewers within the same simulation, whereby they
collectively constitute a hyperreal court of public opinion. This hyperreal “court” further
exemplifies hyperreality’s destruction of the “real” by exercising its (simulated) power to judge
on actual courtroom proceedings, which otherwise hinge on the very distinction between the
“true” and the “false” that hyperreality eradicates. The simulation of the pursuit of justice is
epitomized by Nancy Grace’s “Justice for Caylee” crusade, in which she projects self-referential
speculation. This chapter will first engage Grace’s coverage of the Anthony trial in order to
illustrate how speculation functions in phase four; it will then examine the French journalistic
perspective on her speculative reporting and its impact on the American public.
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3.1 Mediated Simulation and the “Implosion of Meaning”
Baudrillard’s fourth phase marks the end of the image as representation and its entrance
into hyperreality, where it constitutes a pure simulacrum that simulates the “real” with no
reference to reality. While images in the first three phases are of the order of “appearances”
concerning the “real,” phase four simulacra possess no relation to the “real” whatsoever. Rather,
they comprise its simulation, which “is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor
even parody[;] it is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real” (Simulacra and
Simulation 2). Pure simulacra generate a hyperreal that eliminates the distinction between the
“true” and the “false,” effectively destroying the “real” altogether. Baudrillard illustrates this
erasure with a medical analogy, in which he differentiates between the feigning and the
simulation of an illness. A doctor might discern that one is faking an illness based on the
absence of “real” symptoms—in other words, by recognizing the “false” relative to the “true.”
However, if one simulates an illness by producing “true” symptoms, it becomes impossible to
determine whether the illness is “real” or “imaginary.” Baudrillard explains that, “if any
symptom can be ‘produced,’ and can no longer be taken as a fact of nature, then every illness can
be considered as simulatable and simulated, and medicine loses its meaning since it only knows
how to treat ‘real’ illnesses according to their objective causes” (3). In other words, simulation is
dangerous because it eliminates meaning. In Baudrillard’s first three image phases,
representation, distortion, and dissimulation are all possible because meaning—the “real”—is
still possible; in phase four, it is unattainable.
The “implosion of meaning” (31) that marks the start of simulation primarily reveals
itself through televised, mediated images, which further entail an implosive relationship with the
viewer. As illustrated by Baudrillard’s medical analogy, simulation begins at the “collapse of the
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two traditional poles into each other;” the “poles” can be taken to represent any dichotomous
relationship (including “transgression” and “law” or “crime” and “justice”). Baudrillard
illustrates the media’s role in the “implosion of meaning” by comparing it to DNA, in which “the
opposing poles of determination vanish” (30). For him, the media functions like “a genetic code
that directs the mutation of the real into the hyperreal;” as such, it constitutes a “gigantic process
of simulation” (30; 80). Furthermore, the distinction between mediated simulacra and the viewer
is eradicated in the same manner as that of the “real” and “imaginary.” Baudrillard explains that,
in hyperreality, “there is no longer any imperative of submission to the model, or to the gaze”
(29); rather, the viewer becomes the simulation. In other words, the image and its audience
merge into a cyclical, hyperreal relationship in which both constitute the same simulation of the
“real.”
In the jury trial context, mediated simulation of the pursuit of justice facilitates its
integration with viewers by staging its own death, by which it forms and legitimizes a hyperreal
court of public opinion that expresses itself through speculation. Baudrillard describes mediated
simulation as “the proof of theatre through antitheater” (19); the media stages the death of a
given principle in order to justify its simulation. In the context of hyperreal jury trial mediation,
the media legitimizes and regenerates its simulation of the pursuit of justice by staging the death
of justice; its hyperreal images “speak themselves through denial” (Baudraillard 19). In the same
move, the media draws viewers into the simulation, with whom it functions as a hyperreal court
of public opinion. The self-denial of hyperreal jury trial mediation primarily manifests in the
form of speculation, through which the media crafts the notion that justice is not being
adequately pursued in the “real,” so it must be simulated; (the hyperreal court of public opinion
must therefore take the pursuit of justice into its own “hands,” so to speak). Subsequently,
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hyperreal mediated speculation self-regenerates by staging the public’s interest in the simulated
pursuit of justice. Baudrillard clarifies the function and regeneration of mediated simulation in
the following way:
Rather than creating communication, it exhausts itself in the act of staging
communication. Rather than producing meaning, it exhausts itself in the staging of
meaning. A gigantic process of simulation that is very familiar. The nondirective
interview, speech, listeners who call in, participation at every level, blackmail through
speech: ‘You are concerned, you are the event, etc.’ More and more information is
invaded by this kind of phantom content, this homeopathic grafting, this awakening
dream of communication. A circular arrangement through which one stages the desire of
the audience, the antitheater of communication, which, as one knows, is never anything
but the recycling in the negative of the traditional institution, the integrated circuit of the
negative. […] [I]t is a circular process—that of simulation, that of the hyperreal. (80-81;
original emphasis)
Ultimately, by projecting speculation, the media “stages” meaning just like it stages death. It
creates hyperreal images of the pursuit of justice that are designed to self-substantiate.

3.2 Hyperreal Speculation as Exemplified by Nancy Grace
In her coverage of jury trials, Nancy Grace largely projects speculation by interviewing
family members and friends of courtroom ‘players’ (usually the defendant or victim), engaging
the opinions of “expert” panelists, encouraging viewers to call in to voice their own opinions and
questions, and—above all—by broadcasting her own judgment. Furthermore, the extent to
which Grace simulates the pursuit of justice—and fosters a hyperreal court of public opinion—is
evidenced in her tendency to conduct her own speculative investigations and deliver her own
verdicts. Finally, Grace bolsters her speculation by bombarding the public with literal images—
chiefly photographs of the defendant, victim, and their family members—which she either
analyzes or simply broadcasts on a loop while she addresses the audience.
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In her coverage of the Anthony trial, for instance, Grace interviews a number of
Anthony’s family members and friends and closely analyzes Anthony’s composure in court in
order to substantiate her own presumption of Anthony’s guilt. At the very start of the trial,
Grace conducts a phone interview with Tot Mom’s (Casey Anthony’s) aunt, who reveals
information that—though apparently worthy of Grace’s “Justice for Caylee” crusade—was
neither shared with police nor the courtroom. Anthony’s aunt explains that, some time prior to
Caylee’s disappearance, Anthony had allegedly stolen money from her grandfather, in response
to which her mother considered having her arrested. Grace then draws the following, highly
speculative conclusion: “If she had only turned Tot Mom into the police then, than none of this
would have ever happened and maybe Caylee would be alive today” (“Casey Anthony’s aunt
breaks silence”). Grace’s obvious disregard for the presumption of innocence only worsens as
the trial continues. In another segment, Grace, along with a panel of “experts” (former lawyers),
discuss Anthony’s decision to exercise her legal right to refuse to “take the stand” in court.
Grace heavily implies that Anthony’s refusal to testify is attributed to fear that her guilt will be
revealed. She exclaims: “Do you really think she had the guts to square off against a veteran
prosecutor on cross examination? It’s not like she’s got her two-year-old little girl with her
anymore…” (“Tot Mom refuses to take the stand!”). Later, following the release of Anthony’s
deposition transcripts, in which the defendant recalls being sexually abused by her father,
Grace—in an appearance on Good Morning America—assures viewers that “none of this was
asserted in front of the jury because the defense knew it was a lie” (Loiaconi, “Nancy Grace:
Casey’s deposition ‘unbelievable’”). Throughout the trial, Grace leaves little room for doubt
regarding her presumption of guilt; but she makes it very clear at the trial’s resolution. In
response to Anthony’s exoneration, Grace insists, “the devil is dancing tonight,” and assures
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viewers that she will continue to try Anthony in the court of public opinion (“The devil is
dancing tonight”). Later in the segment, she announces the whereabouts of Anthony and her
defense team, encouraging viewers to visit (read: harass) them. In her consistent projection of
speculation, Grace simulates the pursuit of justice by awarding herself and the hyperreal court of
public opinion the simulated power to judge.
Throughout the trial, Grace bombards viewers with various images, whose depictions
include dramatic courtroom proceedings, incriminating photographs of Anthony, and Caylee
(both alive and dead), all of which serve as fodder for her speculation. In one segment, for
example, Grace analyzes images of Anthony’s mother, sobbing on the witness stand. Grace
attacks Anthony’s comparatively stoic disposition: “She’s just sitting there, just looking at her
mother like, ‘who are you?’ At one point, [her mother] had to stand and look at Tot Mom, she
had to stand and they begrudgingly looked at each other. There was no love from Tot Mom
toward her mother” (“Cindy Anthony sobs as 911 call plays”). In another segment, Grace loops
graphic images of Caylee’s remains while describing them in chilling, dramatic, and—above
all—entirely unnecessary detail. She goes on to describe Anthony’s response to the same images
in court, which had caused her to sob and fall ill. One of her “expert” panelists—this time, one
of Grace’s producers—confirms yet again the presumption of Anthony’s guilt by exclaiming,
“the only time Casey Anthony cries in court is when it’s all about her” (“Tot Mom sobs”). (After
all, why should a murderer weep over her victim?) Furthermore, Grace bombards viewers with
photographs even when she is not conducing one of her expert image analyses. While
conducting interviews or delivering a colorful monologue, she very often (if not always) splits
the screen to allow for a simultaneous cycle of images, incessantly providing the viewer with
incriminating depictions of Anthony, which are typically presented alongside compelling images
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of an innocent, smiling Caylee. In any case, though the images themselves prove nothing and
are taken entirely out of context, they ultimately bolster her speculation.

3.3 The Hyperreal Court of Public Opinion Inside the “Real” Courtroom
The hyperrreality of mediated speculation projected by “stars” like Grace comes to a
head when the hyperreal court of public opinion exercises influence over the actual trial, which is
otherwise governed by “real” law—defined by Baudrillard as simulacra of the second order.
Baudrillard explains three “orders” of simulacra: first, simulacra “founded on the image;”
second, “simulacra that are productive, productivist, founded on energy, force;” and third,
“simulacra of simulation” (121). The progression from first to third is characterized by a
reduction of the gap between the “poles” of the “true” and the “false.” For Baudrillard, law
qualifies as a simulacrum of the second order, where the “poles” have yet to implode. Because it
still has access to the “real,” the actual trial, as it proceeds inside the courtroom, does not belong
to the hyperreal. However, since the hyperreal court of public opinion belongs to third order
“simulacra of simulation,” where the “true” and the “false” are “reabsorbed on behalf of the
model” (121), its imposition on the courtroom abolishes the “real” and undermines justice
altogether. In the Anthony trial, for instance, the hyperreal court of public opinion—chiefly via
its demand for images like those diffused by Grace—directly impacted Anthony’s defense team.
In an interview with PBS’s Frontline, José Baez—Anthony’s lead defense attorney—revealed
that, during the trial, his team received $200,000 from ABC in exchange for photographs of the
defendant. Furthermore, Baez maintained that the payout enabled his team to mount an effective
defense; more specifically, the money permitted the defense to challenge—and deem
inconclusive—the forensic evidence against Anthony, which would later play a sizeable part in
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her exoneration. In other words, were it not for the excessive diffusion and consumption of
images by the media and the hyperreal court of public opinion, ABC might not have valued the
photographs so highly (if at all), and Anthony’s defense might not have been sufficient to secure
her acquittal. In the Anthony trial, mediated hyperreality appears to have had a direct effect on
the legal process, which suggests that the hyperreal court of public opinion did away with “real”
justice altogether.
Finally, simulation’s threat against the “real” regarding the Anthony trial was
foreshadowed by Grace’s coverage of the court’s arduous search for impartial jurors, which
further illustrates the extent to which mediated simulation is self-referential. On one of her
segments, Grace and an “expert” guest recount the high proportion of potential jurors who were
rejected for having illustrated a presumption of guilt. (Anthony’s arrest and subsequent “perp
walk,” like those of Simpson, were heavily mediated in the months prior to her trial.) Grace’s
guest describes one of the potential jurors—a “woman who watches [Grace’s] show every
night”—who was turned away due to bias. She and Grace express shock at the woman’s
rejection for, as a loyal follower of Grace, she surely knew “more than anyone else about the
actual case” and would have therefore made a great juror (“Potential jurors say Tot Mom is
guilty”). They go on to marvel incredulously at the approval of a second woman who, according
to Grace and her guest, should never have been selected as a juror because she “doesn’t even pay
attention to the news,” and is therefore under-informed. Apparently ignorant of the meaning of
the word, “impartial,” Grace and her guest confirm that their speculative simulation of the
pursuit of justice is, in fact, self-referential and out of touch with reality. Ultimately, mediated
simulation of the “real” like that of Grace, along with the influence exercised by the hyperreal
court of public opinion on actual courtroom proceedings, constitute “the most serious crime,
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because it cancels out the difference upon which the law is based” (Baudrillard, Simulacra and
Simulation; original emphasis). Phase four mediated jury trial simulacra—exemplified by
Grace—transcend loss of reference to the “real” to destroy it entirely.

3.4 French Reporting on the Hyperspeculated and Hypermediated Anthony Trial
As the most mediated jury trial in the U.S. since O.J. Simpson, the American frenzy over
the Casey Anthony affair attracted attention and criticism from a number of French journalists.
Beyond the public’s fascination with the trial, the French—notably Laure Mandeville, who
covered the trial for Le Figaro—heavily criticized the speculative reporting of Nancy Grace. As
the Anthony trial overlapped with the DSK affair, some French journalists viewed the Anthony
trial mediation—especially Grace’s presumptuous “Justice for Caylee” campaign—as
confirmation of their suspicion that the American media undermines the presumption of
innocence. While none of the journalists engaged the term “hyperreality,” their criticism of
mediated speculation—including the excessive use of images—and the extent to which it
undermines the pursuit of justice illustrates the media’s role as phase four simulacra.
Laure Mandeville discusses the media’s hand in the public hysteria surrounding the
Anthony trial—accomplished in part by the unnecessary bombardment of images. She begins
one article by describing the millions of Americans who, for weeks, remained engrossed by
televised images of Anthony and her daughter, diffused “en boucle presque jusqu’à la nausée” by
media outlets like HLN (“Casey Anthony, l’autre procès qui fascine et divise l’Amérique” 8).
Such images include depictions of Anthony “assise, les yeux baissés, dans la salle d’audience,
d’autres de Casey faisant sauter Caylee sur ses genoux, mais aussi des photos d’elle dansant
langoureusement sous les spots de discothèques, ou des images de paquets en plastique supposés

52

	
  
contenir les ossements de l’enfant” (8). She goes on to condemn the use of such images, which
cast a sinister light on Anthony and served only to evoke an emotional, presumptuous response
from viewers. Mandeville asserts: “Ces photos ne prouvent rien et sont detachées de leur
contexte. Mais bombardées sur les écrans jour après jour, elles contribuent à créer un climat
presque hystérique dans une opinion qui a tendance à s’identifier avec le destin tragique de la
petite fille” (8). In an article for Le Monde, Corine Lesnes notes the same “hysteria,” which she
suggests was disproportionately large given the case. She remarks: “Et sans que personne ne
puisse exactement dire pourquoi—l’infanticide, l’insouciance de la mère, l’énigme, l’été? —, les
télévisions se sont enflammées” (“Lettre des Etats-Unis” 28). An unnecessary addition to trial
reporting, the bombardment of mediated images of Anthony and her daughter ultimately served
the speculative simulation of the pursuit of justice—chiefly that of Nancy Grace.
Mandeville and Lesnes both criticize the extent to which Grace and her highly
speculative “Justice for Caylee” crusade undermined the presumption of innocence. In one
article, Mandeville describes HLN’s coverage of the Anthony trial, in which Grace and one of
her fellow (though much less notorious) anchors, Greta Van Susteren, “donnent leur avis d’une
voix forte sans faire dans la dentelle, jouant sur les émotions de l’opinion, tranchant et découpant
comme si elles étaient juges de l’affaire” (“Casey Anthony, L’autre procès qui fascine et divise
l’Amérique”). In another article, revealingly titled “Aux Etats-Unis, le tribunal médiatique dicte
sa loi,” Mandeville continues her attack on Grace and her deliberate projection of speculation.
She summarizes Grace’s trial mediation in the following way: “Loin de peser le pour et le contre,
Grace a toujours instruit à charge, convoquant sur son plateau les invites qui noircissaient
l’image de la jeune mère” (6). Having already condemned Anthony in the hyperreal court of
public opinion, Grace’s incriminating tirades against Anthony resemble, for Lesnes, the “furie
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vengeresse” of a “tricoteuse devant la guillotine" (“Lettre des Etats-Unis” 28)—an especially
gruesome image, since Anthony faced the death penalty.
Grace’s Tot Mom never made it to the “guillotine,” but that did not discourage the anchor
from continuing her condemnatory crusade; Mandeville examines the anchor’s refusal to “[voir]
s’écrouler ‘son procès,’” revealing the extent to which Grace simulated the pursuit of justice
(“Aux Etats-Unis, le tribunal médiatique dicte sa loi” 6; original emphasis). Mandeville notes:
“Loin de s’interroger, la justicière du petit écran a redoublé d’invectives, affirmant qu’elle
continuerait de juger Casey Anthony devant le tribunal de l’opinion” (6). Moreover, Mandeville
recounts incredulously the mass of journalists who, at Grace’s command, flooded to the
restaurant where Anthony and her defense team dined post-verdict pour “dévers[er] sa colère sur
leur capacité à tromper des jurés ‘irrationnels.’ […] Un comportement qui révèle le
déchaînement de l’opinion avide de ‘pain et de jeux’ judiciaires” (6; original emphasis). She
compares the “frénésie” propelled by Grace to the media circus surrounding DSK’s “perp walk,”
which, she concludes, reveals “un système médiatique prêt à s’immiscer sans scrupule dans les
affaires de justice” (“Aux Etats-Unis, le tribunal médiatique dicte sa loi” 6). By projecting
speculation and casting her own judgment with no regard for the “real” trial, Grace essentially
takes the law into her own hands.
French reporting further highlights the role of the American public in the simulation of
the pursuit of justice—specifically its simulated power to judge. Mandeville describes the
“véritable hystérie collective” that overtook millions of Americans, many of whom—from all
over the U.S.—manifested at the courthouse in Florida to try for a front-row seat at the trial
(“Aux Etats-Unis, le tribunal médiatique dicte sa loi” 6). Those unable to enter the courthouse
were resigned to “faire le pied de grue devant le tribunal en criant ‘Baby killer’ à l’adresse de
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Casey Anthony” (“Casey Anthony, l’autre procès qui fascine et divise l’Amérique” 8). Chetrit
also emphasizes the public’s engagement in the trial; she remarks that, following the trial’s
conclusion, “la foule agglutinée devant le tribunal continuait à crier ‘Justice pour Caylee’ et
‘Meurtrière d’enfants’” (“Floride: Casey Anthony Acquittée”). Moreover, the impact of the
court of public opinion with regard to Anthony, as well as the DSK “perp walk,” motivate
Mandeville to voice a more general critique of both the American media and judicial systems.
She explains: “La réalité est que le système pénal américain est profondément dysfonctionnel.
[…] La justice pénale est en effet très perméable à la pression de l’opinion publique. […]
L’immixtion spectaculaire des médias dans ces affaires de justice fait-elle partie du problème?
En Amérique, on adore se précipiter pour juger. […] L’immixtion des médias est omniprésente”
(“Dershowitz: ‘En Amérique, on adore se précipiter pour juger’” 6). For French journalists, the
public frenzy over the Anthony trial, based in large part on the speculative reporting of “stars”
like Grace, culminates in a blatant disregard for the “real” pursuit of justice.

***

While Nancy Grace’s speculative reporting is especially brazen, the projection of
speculation—and the subsequent simulation of the pursuit of justice—by media “stars” is not
uncommon. Mediation of the Simpson trial, for instance, included numerous public polls,
interviews with family members and, like Grace’s coverage of the Anthony affair, bombarded
the public with out-of-context images. Furthermore, by merging with the public to form the
hyperreal court of public opinion, mediated jury trial speculation not only threatens the public’s
perception of the pursuit of justice—it threatens the “real” pursuit of justice inside the
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courtroom. Ultimately, although mediated images can be organized in each of Baudrillard’s four
phases, the impact of phase four simulation on “real” courtroom proceedings, insofar as it
threatens the legitimacy of law, appears to bring into question that of the three initial image
phases. The media’s ability to simulate the pursuit of justice seems to suggest that, once
achieved (at least with regard to jury trial mediation), hyperreality is irreversible.
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CONCLUSION
For many French intellectuals and journalists, American jury trial mediation threatens the
pursuit of justice by serving the consumer capitalist agenda of spectacle and ultimately
projecting speculation. In order to trace the development and implications of the growing divide
between jury trial images and the pursuit of justice, this study examined such images within the
theoretical framework of Jean Baudrillard’s image phases. At the fundamental level of the
courtroom-theatre, the case presented by the lawyer-as-actor before the juror-spectator functions
as a phase one image—a colorful representation of the pursuit of justice. When the lawyer
advances to the role of producer and/or dramatist, the image transitions into phase two, where it
distorts the pursuit of justice. Such distortion is largely due to the lawyer’s obligation to serve
the narrow interests of his/her client, as well as the pedagogical use of courtroom-inspired fiction
to incite new levels of courtroom theatrics. The presence of news cameras inside the courtroom
marks the shift into phase three, where the media diffuses jury trial images that mask the absence
of the pursuit of justice. Mediated images in the third phase represent the consumer capitalist
pursuit of spectacle rather than justice, which is evidenced by both the media’s penchant for
especially remarkable trials and its tendency to sensationalize the mundane. Furthermore, phase
three reveals the complicity of the American public—consumers of spectacular images—in the
displacement of the pursuit of justice by spectacle. Finally, the media’s projection of speculative
images signals the progression into phase four, where jury trial mediation loses references to—
and ultimately destroys—the “real” pursuit of justice by simulating it. In this phase, mediated
speculation merges with consumers to form a self-referential, regenerative hyperreal court of
public opinion that ultimately doubles back on the “real” courtroom to threaten the legitimacy of
justice altogether.
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Implications and Limitations
In keeping with Baudrillardian nihilism, the most problematic—and perhaps most
obvious—implication of this study is the self-destruction of the four images phases. While this
study asserted the simultaneous existence of each of Baudrillard’s phases, the theorist, himself,
believed postmodern American society to be fully and irreversibly hyperreal. For him, the first
three image phases have therefore already come and gone; like the “real,” they are no longer
possible. It was stated in the introduction that this study would stand in deliberate contradiction
to Baudrillard in this regard. However, the fact that “real” proceedings inside the courtroom are
vulnerable to the influence of phase four’s hyperreal court of public opinion suggests that, while
the lawyer, for instance, might theoretically correspond with Baudrillard’s first two phases, the
destruction of the “real” in the final phase retroactively delegitimizes all that precedes it. In
other words, once in the hyperreal, mediated images destroy the possibility of the first three
phases. In attempting to contradict Baudrillard by tracing jury trial images through all four
phases, this study ultimately revealed the impossibility of doing so, and affirmed Baudrillard’s
belief that postmodern America (at least with regards to jury trial mediation) is, in fact, fully
hyperreal. All the same, Baudrillard’s image phases provide a useful framework in which to
examine (and attempt to understand) the progression from representation to hyperreality, which
might further aid in revealing possible implications of hyperreality for American justice and
culture.
One such implication, for instance, is a possible connection between the virtuality of jury
trial mediation and the resilience of capital punishment in the United States. A practice
abolished by America’s first world contemporaries, including France, the death penalty is
implemented in thirty-two states in the U.S., which featured a total of 3,035 inmates on death
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row as of October 1, 2014 (Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), “Fact Sheet” 1).4
America’s continued use of capital punishment flies in the face increasing rates of exoneration
and data illustrating its failure to deter crime. For instance, while the South accounts for over
80% of America’s executions, it maintains the nation’s highest murder rate (DPIC, “Fact Sheet”
3). Furthermore, over 150 death row inmates have been acquitted with evidence of their
innocence since 1973, and annual exoneration rates have since gradually increased, presumably
due to advancements in forensics technology (DPIC, “Fact Sheet” 2). In light of both the
ineffectiveness of capital punishment as a deterrent to crime and the inevitable loss of innocent
lives, its continued use in the U.S. is perplexing; the hyperreality of trial mediation might,
however, offer an explanation. It is possible that the American public’s experience of the jury
trial is now so virtual that the death penalty no longer involves human life; rather, the alleged
perpetrator functions as a symbol of transgression—a threat to American morality and justice,
the demise of which has been—and continues to be—efficiently staged by the media via the
projection of hyperreal images. As a first-world country on equal ground with the U.S. in terms
of economic and technological development, the fact that France abolished the death penalty
over thirty years ago—and prohibits mediated speculation of its jury trials—seems to support a
correlation between hyperreal media coverage and the persistence of legalized murder.
However, many Americans oppose capital punishment, which brings to light a limitation
of this study: there are various American intellectuals and journalists who are leery of the
American media’s pursuit of spectacle and its generation of a hyperreality. For example, this
study was informed by Les Essif’s American ‘Unculture’ in French Drama: Homo Americanus
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4
The Death Penalty Information Center is a nonprofit organization that publishes reports related
to capital punishment in the U.S. The DPIC sources its data from federal agencies like the
Bureau of Justice Statistics and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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and the Post-1960 French Resistance, in which the author explores Baudrillard’s hyperreality
and Debord’s spectacle in direct relation to a American (un)culture. Terry Eagleton, as a second
example, critiques the role of mediated images and consumer capitalism in postmodern
American culture in The Idea of Culture. America also has its share of journalists who, like the
French, criticize the media coverage of the Simpson, Strauss-Kahn, and Anthony trials. For
instance, Adam Cohen for Time Magazine cites—and agrees with—the French outrage over the
DSK “perp walk,” asserting that, “perp walks can do irreparable hard to a defendant’s right to a
presumption of innocence and a fair trial” (“DSK Fallout”). Though this study did not address
Americans who identify with the French perspective, the existence of these thinkers does not
change the hyperreality that characterizes jury trial mediation in the U.S. The American media
and legal systems permit the diffusion of images that sensationalize, criminalize, and speculate.
Such images constitute a direct reflection of American culture, for the media does not source its
power from the ethers; there will always be members of the American public who engage in—
and propel—mediated images that undermine the pursuit of justice. Ultimately, the American
media system and the consumers who participate in it allow for the generation of a mediated
hyperreality with regard to justice that would not be possible in France.
***
This study concentrated on the media’s role in generating a very specific brand of
American spectacle and hyperreality; there remain various avenues for further research. It would
be worthwhile, for example, to shift the gaze in the direction of the American public—the
audience to which the media appeals—in order to more fully examine the hyperreal role of
consumers. In the interest of a more detailed cultural analysis, a side-by-side examination of
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French and American reporting—print and televised—on a selection of trials would surely prove
enlightening.
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